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ABSTRACT 
Sex-for-hire is usually illegal, unless it is being filmed. Debates 
about pornography tread uneasily into legal terrain that implicates 
freedom of expression under the First Amendment, the specter of 
censorship, and genuine concerns about the function and role of 
pornography in persistent gender inequality. It is less common for 
conversations about pornography to include a discussion of copyright 
law. Yet copyright law is a powerful tool that operates to protect the 
financial interests of pornographers. Owners of copyrighted 
pornography frequently threaten public exposure of an alleged 
infringer’s consumption habits in order to force a financial 
settlement. Thus copyright law operates as both a metaphoric legal 
shield and sword in the hands of pornographers. This Article 
introduces to the scholarly conversation consideration of how 
copyright law might be used by opponents of pornography, 
particularly those who oppose specific types of pornography such as 
child pornography, so-called “revenge porn,” “crush porn,” or 
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filmed physical abuse. A strong case can be made that such materials 
do not warrant copyright protection. Copyright protection is not a 
necessary prerequisite to authorship, publication or circulation. 
Withholding copyright protection would sharply reduce the economic 
value of these particular works, but might also give rise to 
inconsistent or even incoherent decisions by government actors who 
would be called upon to make difficult assessments between and 
among types of pornography. 
INTRODUCTION 
ex-for-hire is usually illegal, unless it is being filmed.
1
 Debates 
about pornography tread uneasily into legal terrain that implicates 
freedom of expression under the First Amendment, the specter of 
censorship, and genuine concerns about the function and role of 
pornography in persistent gender inequality. It is less common for 
conversations about pornography to include a discussion of copyright 
law. Yet copyright law is a powerful tool that operates to protect the 
financial interests of those pornographers who rely heavily on the 
copyright laws to deter unauthorized copying. It is not uncommon for 
the owner of copyrighted pornography to threaten public exposure of 
an alleged infringer’s consumption habits to force a financial 
settlement of unauthorized copying claims. Copyright law operates 
both as a metaphoric shield and sword in the hands of pornographers. 
This Article turns the scholarly conversation to consider how 
copyright law might be used by those who oppose specific types of 
pornography such as child pornography,
2
 “crush porn,”
3
 so-called 
“revenge porn,”
4
 or filmed physical abuse.
5
 
To the extent that actual people are harmed during the production 
of pornographic material or as a consequence of its distribution and 
consumption, a strong case can be made that the government 
constitutionally may decline to provide copyright protection. The 
rationale for declining to provide copyright protection is that these 
materials cannot reasonably be construed as promoting “progress” or 
 
1 See infra Part I.C. 
2 See infra Part III.B.2. 
3 See infra Part III.B.3. 
4 See infra Part III.B.4. 
5 See infra Part III.B.5. 
S 
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“useful arts”
6
 because their production or distribution directly harms 
people. Withholding copyright protections would sharply reduce the 
economic value of these particular works without unconstitutionally 
preventing their authorship or precluding their publication or 
circulation. Such an approach to copyright protection, however, 
would require government actors to make difficult assessments about 
which pornographic works belonged in the nonprotected categories, 
and their decisions might not be consistent or even coherent. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the relationship of copyright law to pornography. Copyright law, 
viewed in a certain light, plays a structural role in the 
commoditization of sex and sexual images. In most jurisdictions in 
the United States, buying and selling sex is illegal, but when sex-for-
hire is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, it becomes an act of 
free speech protected by the First Amendment.
7
 That tangible 
medium also gains protection under copyright law. Pornographers use 
copyright law to facilitate profitable commercial exploitation of their 
works. 
Against this background, Part II explores the ways in which 
copyright law in general is not content neutral. Indeed, in order to 
obtain a protectable copyright, one must demonstrate the existence of 
“original” content. Once a copyright is secured, copyright law 
constructs operate to suppress (by labeling as “infringing,” and thus 
illegal) any content that is substantially similar to or derivative of the 
copyrighted work. From an analytic perspective that suppression 
operates as a form of content-based, government-sponsored 
censorship in the broadest sense of the word. To be sure, copyright 
law allows for “fair use” as a right or privilege, or as an affirmative 
defense to an allegation of copyright infringement. In this way, 
copyright law includes a mechanism that seeks to soften the 
suppressive aspect of copyright enforcement. Whether an 
unauthorized use is “fair” is a legal determination that is, by 
definition, not content neutral (i.e., it requires substantive 
consideration of the allegedly offending work). Thus robust copyright 
protection for any book, image, film, or other copyrightable work 
 
6 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power 
. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7  See infra Part I. 
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requires (at least) two content-specific inquiries by the government: 
first as to the originality of the initial work, and second as to any fair 
use by any allegedly offending work. 
Part III considers the relationship between pornography and 
copyright law. Numerous legal scholars have offered critiques and 
defenses of pornography that are sophisticated and sustained.
8
 One of 
the most well-known critiques of pornography takes a harms-based 
approach.
9
 It considers the potential harm to actual human beings 
during the production, distribution, or consumption of pornography. 
This part of the Article applies this harms-based framework in the 
copyright context and considers how labeling such works non-
progressive or non-useful would put them beyond the purview of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Types of 
pornography that would lose copyright protection under this 
framework include child pornography, crush pornography, revenge 
pornography, and pornography in which the performers are physically 
abused or endangered. 
Part IV argues that the government’s withholding of copyright 
protection from this narrowly defined band of pornographic works 
will reduce the incentives for its creation and distribution. Thus 
copyright law could become a powerful tool in the hands of 
pornography’s opponents. 
Part V argues that there is, in fact, a clear precedent for amending 
the Copyright Act to deny protection to “non-progressive” and “non-
useful” pornographic works. In the trademark context, the Lanham 
Act
10
 prohibits the federal registration of “scandalous” or “immoral” 
marks. Such content-specific restriction has been found to be 
constitutionally permissible.
11
 Although that prohibition is enforced 
inconsistently, it nevertheless suggests the contours of legitimate, 
content-based denial of formal governmental protection for certain 
intellectual property. 
 
8 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 
589 (1986); Robert Jensen & Debbie Okrina, Pornography and Sexual Violence, 
VAWNET.ORG (July 2004), http://www.vawnet.org/sexual-violence/print-document.php 
?doc_id=418&find_type=web_desc_AR. 
9 See infra Part III.A. 
10 Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
11 See infra Part V.B. 
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I 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE COMMODITIZATION OF SEX 
Pornography is a wildly lucrative copyrightable commodity.
12
 And 
though this sounds like a bad joke, the reproduction right is heavily 
relied upon by commercial pornographers.
13
 Anyone on the Internet 
is generally only a click or typographical error away from 
pornography, much of which is profitably distributed by mainstream 
American corporations.
14
 Copyright law has played an important role 
in the law and economics of pornography since 1979, when a federal 
court concluded that pornographic films were eligible for copyright 
protection just like any other kind of movie.
15
 Instantiation of a legal 
norm protecting the making of commercial pornography under the 
auspices of dominant First Amendment jurisprudence if all parties are 
eighteen or older came almost a decade later.
16
 The importance of 
copyright protection to pornographers has increased greatly since the 
Internet has become their primary distribution mechanism.
17
 To 
 
12 See Michael Brush, Porn Stocks Worth, Um, Watching, MSN MONEY (Oct. 31, 2007, 
12:01 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20071102065704/http://articles.moneycentral.msn 
.com/Investing/CompanyFocus/PornStocksWorthUmWatching.aspx (accessed by 
searching for original URL in the Internet Archive “Wayback Machine”); Jerry Ropelato, 
Internet Pornography Statistics, TOP TEN REVIEWS, http://internet-filter-review 
.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) (“The 
pornography industry has larger revenues than Microsoft, Google, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo, 
Apple and Netflix combined. 2006 Worldwide Pornography Revenues ballooned to $97.06 
billion.”); see also Richard Corliss, That Old Feeling: When Porno Was Chic, TIME (Mar. 
29, 2005), available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1043267,00.html. 
13 See generally Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”), 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
14 See Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 799, 806–07 (2008) (describing mainstream commercial success of consumer 
goods bearing Playboy logo and brand, Playboy’s separate investments in hardcore 
pornography business, and financial profit from pornography by hoteliers and 
communications industry concerns); Advertising Policies, GOOGLE, http://support 
.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=176004 (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (noting that Google allows advertising for adult sites, with limitations); see also 
DAVID A. VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 165 (updated ed. 2005) (“Google makes millions of 
dollars annually on pornography ads displayed alongside search results. . . . [B]oth Google 
and its biggest competitor, Yahoo, profit handsomely by selling sex-related ads.”). 
15 See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman case). 
17 See Nicholas Confessore, Porn and Politics in a Digital Age, PBS FRONTLINE (Feb. 
7, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/special/politics.html 
(observing promulgation of home computers facilitates production and distribution of 
pornography); see also Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of 
Search Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2006/01/20/technology/20google.html?pagewanted=all (“American Web sites that show 
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illustrate briefly, Google received more copyright-rooted cease and 
desist letters related to adult content than to mainstream movies. 
Adult-content complaints were second in number only to complaints 
pertaining to music.
18
 
A.  The Contours of Copyrightable Sex 
Pornography can take the form of written accounts
19
 or visual 
images, moving or static, of human beings explicitly engaged in sex 
acts, or depicted in overtly sexualized poses. Pornographic works are 
potentially vested with copyright protection upon creation and 
fixation in tangible mediums of expression
20
 as literary works,
21
 
dramatic works,
22
 pantomimes and choreographic works,
23
 pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works,
24
 motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works,
25
 or compilations or derivative works.
26
 
If commoditized sex follows the same commercial patterns as other 
kinds of physical performances such as dance choreography, 
pantomimes, or yoga, most of the sex-related copyrights in 
contemporary currency are fixed in the form of literary, pictorial and 
audiovisual works.
27
 Alternative means of fixation such as notation 
 
explicit content get as many as 60 million visitors a day, according to testimony given to 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation by Paul Cambria, 
general counsel for the Adult Freedom Foundation, an organization that represents the 
interests of the pornography industry.”). 
18 Data from the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/stats.cgi (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (reporting number of 
complaints in 2010 was 966 for movies, 2,021 for adult content, and 3,906 for music). 
19 The production of written pornography is extremely unlikely to be harmful to the 
author, unless there is direct coercion at play. Whether exclusively textual works can even 
constitute pornography is disputed. See, e.g., Dana Wollman, Amazon No Longer Selling 
Guide for Pedophiles, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://seattletimes 
.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013405553_apustecamazonpedophiliabook1stldwritethru.
html (revealing President of American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression takes 
the view that entirely textual works are not pornography). 
20 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2006). 
21 Id. § 102(a)(1). 
22 Id. § 102(a)(3). 
23 Id. § 102(a)(4). 
24 Id. § 102(a)(5). 
25 Id. § 102(a)(6). 
26 Id. § 103. 
27 See Dramatic Works: Scripts, Pantomimes, and Choreography, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl119.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter 
Copyright Office, Dramatic Works]. Cf. Lhendup Gyatso Bhutia, Saving Yoga From 
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may be possible,
28
 but would likely be expensive, overly complicated, 
and of uncertain monetary value.
29
 
Commercial control of traditional choreographic works probably 
relies more on norms about copying and attribution within the dance 
industry than on formal copyright protections.
30
 This makes 
analogizing sex and dance moves analytically unhelpful in discerning 
the impact of copyright law, despite the fact that dancing has been 
characterized as “the vertical expression of a horizontal desire, 
legalized by music.”
31
 Whether there are similar norms within the 
pornography industry is unknown to this author, but I have not seen 
any evidence of them. Commercial pornographers seem to make their 
creative choices in direct response to perceived consumer demand,
32
 
which apparently leads to heavy concentrations of very similar 
audiovisual works within popular genres such as gonzo, all-girl, older 
woman-younger girl, young girl, anal-themed, big butt, oral, ethnic-
themed, interracial, big bust, MILF, internal, orgy, gangbang, BDSM, 
squirting, strap-on, transsexual, three way, and double penetration.
33
 
 
Copyright Mongers, DNA DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (July 18, 2010, 12:22 AM), 
http://www.dnaindia.com/lifestyle/report_saving-yoga-from-copyright-mongers_141120 
6-all. 
28 Copyright Office, Dramatic Works, supra note 27. 
29 See Joi Michelle Lakes, A pas de deux for Choreography and Copyright, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1829, 1853–55 (2005) (discussing notation-based means of fixing choreographic 
works); see also Julie Van Camp, Copyright of Choreographic Works, in 1994–1995 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 59, 67 (Stephen F. Breimer et 
al. eds., 1994), available at http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/copyrigh.html. 
30 See William Patry, Choreography and Alternatives to Copyright Law, THE PATRY 
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 18, 2005, 1:45 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08 
/choreography-and-alternatives-to.html (observing relatively low number of copyright 
registrations by choreographers suggests “choreographers’ decision not to rely on 
copyright and to instead develop their own ‘community’ system of protection”). 
31 Compare George Bernard Shaw Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com 
/quotation/dancing-the_vertical_expression_of_a_horizontal/259005.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2012) (crediting the quote to George Bernard Shaw), with Robert Frost: Quotes, 
GOODREADS.COM, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/123294 (last visited Mar. 5, 
2012) (crediting the quote to Robert Frost). 
32 Some pornography is likely produced for reasons other than commercial exploitation. 
See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1746343 (arguing that there are natural and intrinsic reasons for creation above and 
beyond the incentives provided by the copyright regime). 
33 These are all awards categories for the Adult Video Network annual awards. 
Nominations for the 2011 AVN Awards, AVN MEDIA NETWORK, http://avnawards.avn 
.com/2011_nominations.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
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Elements such as dialogue, plot, costumes, and scenery are 
copyrightable just as they are in non-pornographic works. But what 
the scope of copyright protection might be in a choreographed 
sequence of explicit sex acts is unclear. One commentator has 
advocated for a very broad definition of choreography, which could 
conceivably include sex acts, writing: 
 The precise meaning of “choreographic works” is not clear, 
however, from prior statutes or case law. Nor is there any evidence 
that Congress intended to limit “choreographic works” to those 
which were protected previously under the category of dramatico-
musical work. Indeed, the creation of the new category of 
“choreographic works” in the copyright law suggests that Congress 
intended to create a broader class of protection. Clearly, Congress 
intended that the Copyright Act provide categories eligible for 
protection with “sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or 
outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories.” . . . . 
 Human movement would seem to be the central element of 
dance, but it is at least arguable that even this requirement is too 
narrow. In Duet, Paul Taylor and his partner do nothing but sit on 
stage, in silence, for three minutes. In 1942, George Balanchine 
choreographed Circus Polka to music by Stravinsky “for 50 
elephants and 50 beautiful girls” for the Barnum and Bailey Circus. 
Another problem with focusing solely on human movement is that it 
is also central in gymnastic routines and figure skating routines, 
which arguably might be subject to protection as “choreographic 
works.” An issue for dance scholars is where to draw the line 
between choreographic movement and other movement. Are there 
some movement designs which should not be protected by this 
copyright provision? On what grounds?
34
 
Protectable dance choreography was described in Horgan v. 
MacMillan as “the composition and arrangement of dance movements 
and patterns, [which] is usually intended to be accompanied by 
music.”
35
 The Second Circuit concluded that “social dance steps and 
simple routines” are not copyrightable.
36
 Analogously pedestrian 
sexual encounters would not be either. Heterosexual intercourse in the 
missionary position might be one very staid example of an 
uncopyrightably banal erotic routine. Any sex act that is prevalent in 
real life or pornography has arguably been dedicated to the public 
 
34 Van Camp, supra note 29, at 60–61 (footnotes omitted). 
35 789 F.2d 157, 161 (1986) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2 THE COMPENDIUM OF 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 450.01 (1984)). 
36 Id. at 161 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2 THE COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE PRACTICES § 450.03(a) (1984)). 
BARTOW 10/4/2012  2:20 PM 
10 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 1 
domain by virtue of copyright’s merger and scènes à faire doctrines; 
courts will not enforce a copyright monopoly on words expressing an 
idea if the concept can only be expressed in a limited number of ways, 
or if the expression embodied in the work flows from a commonplace 
idea.
37
 Sets, props, camera angles, dialogue, and the overall sequence 
of sex acts would confer copyright in a particular performance, but it 
might be thin, especially with respect to the sexual component. 
Like sex, yoga can be comprised of a series of widely practiced and 
fairly predictable physical moves. In a lawsuit involving claims of 
infringement of an allegedly copyright-protected series of yoga 
asanas, one of the works at issue was described by the plaintiff as a 
“compilation of exercises.”
38
 The case ultimately settled, but before it 
did there was a district court opinion denying the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, based on a rather doctrinally dubious 
conclusion that if the plaintiff established at trial that his copyright in 
the Bikram yoga style was valid, under Section 106(a)(4) he would 
retain the exclusive right to authorize the public performance of his 
sequence of asanas.
39
 This claim is highly contested in the context of 
cultural commoditization,
40
 and has subsequently been undercut by a 
decision by the U.S. Copyright Office to stop registering yoga poses 
and their sequences as choreographic works.
41
 The Copyright Office 
 
37 See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
the merger doctrine); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(explaining the scènes à faire doctrine). 
38 William Patry, Yoga and Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 22, 2005, 
10:30 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/yoga-and-copyright.html (referring 
to Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10440 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005), and arguing that “[a] decision that Bikram had a copyright 
in a pictorial compilation of 26 exercises or in narration about them would be 
uncontroversial, no more so than a compilation of someone’s choices of the best Indian 
restaurants in New York City,” but that the court’s extending copyright protection to 
public performance of the exercises was “controversial, indeed, outrageously wrong”). 
39 See id. (expressing surprise that “a court would entertain the possibility that one 
could acquire exclusive rights over the performance of yoga exercises”). 
40 See, e.g., Paul Vitello, Hindu Group Stirs a Debate Over Yoga’s Soul, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/nyregion 
/28yoga.html?_r=1&sq=hindu&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all; Meredith Hoffman, Off 
the Mat, Into Court: Lawsuit Pits Bikram and Yoga to the People, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM 
(Dec. 1, 2011, 7:22 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/off-the-mat-into   
-court-lawsuit-pits-bikram-and-yoga-to-the-people/?hp. 
41 See, e.g., Tarsha Luke, Hold Your Flow! Yoga Sequences Not Copyrightable, MEDIA 
LAW BYTES & PIECES (June 27, 2012), http://www.medialawbytesandpieces.com/2012/06 
/27/hold-your-flow-yoga-sequences-not-copyrightable/#page=1. See also Ellen Rosen, 
Yoga Pose Copyright Bid Too Much of a Stretch, U.S. Says in Bikram Battle, BLOOMBERG 
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also issued a related statement on June 12, 2012, that said in pertinent 
part: 
An example that has occupied the attention of the Copyright Office 
for quite some time involves the copyrightability of the selection 
and arrangement of preexisting exercises, such as yoga poses. 
Interpreting the statutory definition of “compilation” in isolation 
could lead to the conclusion that a sufficiently creative selection, 
coordination or arrangement of public domain yoga poses is 
copyrightable as a compilation of such poses or exercises. However, 
under the policy stated herein, a claim in a compilation of exercises 
or the selection and arrangement of yoga poses will be refused 
registration. Exercise is not a category of authorship in section 102 
and thus a compilation of exercises would not be copyrightable 
subject matter.
42
 
Efforts to monopolize depictions of sexual intercourse would likely 
be similarly resisted. In addition, though unique sequences of sex acts 
might be adequately expressive and original enough to warrant 
copyright protection as a theoretical matter, whether judges would be 
willing and able to comfortably articulate a coherent standard for the 
copyrightability of copulation variations is uncertain.
43
 
B.  Literal Copying and Infringement Allegations 
Fairly extensive case law research by this author suggests that the 
vast majority of copyright infringement cases that have been brought 
in which the plaintiff works were articles of commercial pornography 
have been premised on allegations of literal copying. No case in 
which infringement liability related to unauthorized use of a 
commercial work of pornography was based on copying that 
constituted substantial similarity or an unauthorized derivative work 
was uncovered by this author’s research.
44
 The reproduction right 
 
(Dec. 9, 2011, 10:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-10/yoga-poses-can   
-t-be-registered-for-copyrights-u-s-says-1-.html. 
42 Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,607 (June 22, 2012) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (emphasis added), available at http://www.gpo.gov 
/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-06-22/pdf/2012-15235.pdf. 
43 See Lakes, supra note 29, at 1853–55; see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-
SIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION PURSUANT TO S. RES. 240 (Comm. Print 1961) 
(Borge Varmer), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study28.pdf. 
44 In International Media Films, Inc. v. Lucas Entertainment, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged 
facts that, if proven, might have resulted in a finding of infringement based on the 
distribution of an unauthorized derivative work, but were unable to show they held the 
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provided to copyright holders in Section 106 of the Copyright Act has 
been successfully exercised by pornographers only in the most direct 
manner. The scope of copyright protection in a work of mainstream 
pornography appears to be judicially untested.
45
 Literal copying has 
either been found infringing
46
 or held to be fair use.
47
 
1.  Pornography as Creative Endeavor? 
Not everyone views pornography as a creative endeavor. Some 
observers perceive a distinction between, for example, artistic 
audiovisual works in which there happens to be “unsimulated” (by 
which they mean actual) sex performed, and works of pornography in 
which there is little imaginative concern about plot, dialogue, scenery, 
or any other variable that is not directly related to the depicted sexual 
exploits.
48
 This reflects an entertainment industry perspective, which 
may or may not be widely held, that audiovisual pornography is a less 
 
restored copyright in the plaintiff’s work. 703 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding disputed chain of title in restored copyright). In Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Market 
Group, Ltd., the plaintiff’s work was a nonpornographic work, Star Wars, while the 
defendant’s work was a pornographic parody, Star Ballz. 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
45 See John Schwartz, The Pornography Industry vs. Digital Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, 2004, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/business/the                  
-pornography-industry-vs-digital-pirates.html (correction appended Feb. 29, 2004) 
(referencing only copyright infringement actions brought against competing companies for 
acts of literal copying). 
46 See Blackman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Flava 
Works, Inc. v. Wyche, No. 10 CV 0748, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64165, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
June 28, 2010); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-03926, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 31639, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 
No. 02 Civ. 3850(HB), 02 Civ. 6277(HB), 03 Civ. 3379(HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24171, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004); Sefton v. Webbworld, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-0042-AH, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6431, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2003); Sefton v. Jew, 204 
F.R.D. 104, 107 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 
982 F. Supp. 503, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1997). Cf. United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 
1519 (11th Cir. 1984); Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002). 
47 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 
(D.C. Cal. 1985). Cf. The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 128 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (detailing how plaintiff claimed copyright in wrapper for cinnamon rolls; 
defendant made pornographic parody). 
48 See Kristin Hohenadel, FILM; Film Goes All the Way (In the Name of Art), N.Y. 
TIMES, (July 1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/01/movies/film-film-goes-all-the 
-way-in-the-name-of-art.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (referencing unsimulated sex in 
films). 
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creative or perhaps even noncreative commodity.
49
 Pornography is 
sometimes characterized as something that is “used,” distinguishable 
in some qualitative way from mainstream literary or audiovisual 
works that contain sex scenes.
50
 Jim Mitchell reportedly quipped that 
the only “art” in pornography was his brother Artie, a fellow 
pornographer with the given name of Arthur.
51
 As law professors 
Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have noted, “Pornography is, 
in large part, a utilitarian product, and for most consumers, the 
purpose for which it is employed is served . . . by a five-minute porn-
tube clip.”
52
 Another commentator observed that “in hotel rooms 
where pornography is available, two-thirds of all movie purchases are 
for pornos; and the average time they are watched is 12 minutes.”
53
 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a jurist would, sua sponte, 
determine that a pedestrian pornographic work was an “idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery” within the meaning of Section 102 of the Copyright 
Act, and therefore outside the purview of copyright protections 
altogether.
54
 The utilitarian nature of some pornography does not 
preclude copyright protection but may render it thin, perhaps so 
limited in scope that it could be infringed only by literal copying. 
 
49 See Schwartz, supra note 45 (“Mr. Cambria suggests that the mainstream 
entertainment industry is much more combative when it comes to consumers partly 
because the songs and movies are so carefully and expensively made and distributed. 
Movies in [the pornography] industry, by contrast, are often made in a few weeks, and on 
budgets that a major studio may spend on coffee and pastries, so piracy is not taken quite 
as seriously. ‘Maybe a classic is one thing,’ he said, ‘but they’re not all classics.’”). 
50 See, e.g., Irving Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship, in 
SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 174, 176 (Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997) 
(asserting that pornography and obscene materials “in the end [are] identical in effect”). 
51 Michael Carlson, Spiking Deep Throat: Gerard Damiano And Jim Mitchell’s 
Guardian Obituaries, IRRESISTIBLE TARGETS (Mar. 6, 2009), http://irresistibletargets 
.blogspot.com/2009/03/buried-deep-throat-gerard-damiano-and.html; see also Corliss, 
supra note 12 (“There’s a lot of porn out there. . . . For the weary businessman it’s just a 
combination [sic] Viagra and Ambien.”). 
52 Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Copyrighting Porn: A Guest Post, FREAKONOMICS 
(May 5, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/copy 
righting-porn-a-guest-post/. 
53 Corliss, supra note 12. 
54 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
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2.  Knowing Pornography When One Sees It 
Unlike audiovisual works, a judge might well conclude that 
elements of pornographic pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works were 
functional and therefore unprotectable through copyright.
55
 Sex toys 
such as vibrators, dildos, butt plugs, nipple clamps, and cock rings 
can certainly simultaneously evince artistic as well as utilitarian 
aspects. But in at least one dispute, a court found dildos lacking 
conceptual separability because they were cast from molds of the 
genitals of pornography performers, and therefore uncopyrightable.
56
 
In and of themselves, sex toys would not generally constitute 
pornography. 
Pornography is difficult to qualitatively define beyond 
“unambiguous depictions of sexual activity.”
57
 When the Supreme 
Court decided Miller v. California in 1973, Chief Justice Burger 
characterized the dispute as “one of a group of ‘obscenity-
pornography’ cases being reviewed by the Court,”
58
 implying that the 
terms obscenity and pornography were interchangeable.
59
 This is no 
longer true, if it ever was. 
In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, the City of 
Indianapolis defined pornography in a civil rights ordinance as “the 
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures 
or in words” that also includes one or more of six other listed 
characteristics.
60
 This definition of pornography was held to be 
 
55 See id. § 113; see also ABA Committee No. 304, PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC, 
SCULPTURAL AND CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS (2005–2006), available at http://meetings 
.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/PT030400/otherlinks_files/304.pdf. 
56 ConWest Res, Inc. v. Playtime Novelties, Inc., No. C 06-5304 SBA, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 85461, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006). 
57 See Erick Janssen, Why People Use Porn, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org 
/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/special/why.html (last visited July 6, 2012) (“Although 
lawyers, feminists, priests, and scientists all have tried to describe it, a satisfactory 
definition of porn does not exist.”). 
58 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973). 
59 He also used the term “hardcore pornography” as if it had a generally accepted 
meaning. See, e.g., id. at 27. 
60 Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985). Those 
conditions were: 
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in 
being raped; or 
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unconstitutional when it was proposed as the basis for redress for civil 
rights violations through administrative and judicial means.
61
 It was 
criticized for being “considerably different” from the judicially 
constructed definition of obscenity that is met when the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that 
a work holistically appeals to the prurient interests, contains patently 
offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and 
has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
62
 This 
“considerable difference” was entirely intentional, part of a conscious 
effort to promote recognition of the harms of pornography outside of 
the confines of the Miller test.
63
 After Hudnut it became less common 
for courts or legal commentators to use the terms “pornography” and 
“obscenity” interchangeably. The current practice is to divide 
pornography into two categories: that which is obscene, and that 
 
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or 
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or 
severed into body parts; or 
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture, 
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes 
these conditions sexual; or 
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, 
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or 
submission or display. 
. . . [T]he use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in 
paragraphs (1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under this 
section. 
Id. 
61 Id. at 332 (“The definition of ‘pornography’ is unconstitutional. No construction or 
excision of particular terms could save it. The offense of trafficking in pornography 
necessarily falls with the definition. We express no view on the district court’s conclusions 
that the ordinance is vague and that it establishes a prior restraint. Neither is necessary to 
our judgment. We also express no view on the argument presented by several amici that 
the ordinance is itself a form of discrimination on account of sex.”). 
62 Id. at 324 (“Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining ‘pornography’ as a practice 
that discriminates against women. ‘Pornography’ is to be redressed through the 
administrative and judicial methods used for other discrimination. The City’s definition of 
‘pornography’ is considerably different from ‘obscenity,’ which the Supreme Court has 
held is not protected by the First Amendment.”). 
63 See, e.g., Pornography: An Exchange: Catharine A. MacKinnon, reply by Ronald 
Dworkin, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 3, 1994), http://www.nybooks.com/articles 
/archives/1994/mar/03/pornography-an-exchange/ (“Since then, every argument [Andrea 
Dworkin and I] have advanced to support this initiative has been an equality argument. 
Every harm pornography does is a harm of inequality, and we have said so.”). 
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which is not.
64
 Obscene pornography, to paraphrase and streamline 
the Miller test, is pornography which the average person would feel 
appeals to prurient interests, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value, if that person was framing her conclusions by 
consciously making reference to contemporary community 
standards.
65
 
Rare is the legal test that does not require a fact finder to 
objectively apply subjective criteria to something or another. 
Consider what a jury is asked to do when evaluating the negligence of 
a defendant in the context of a tort action, or when comparing two 
works to discern whether they are substantially similar in a copyright 
infringement dispute. Nevertheless, obscenity inquiries are especially 
thorny. Whether a work is legally obscene, and therefore illegal, 
depends upon the viewpoint of an observer and that observer’s 
assumptions about fellow community members: who they are, what 
they think generally, and how they might react, emotionally and 
aesthetically, to a particular work.
66
 Because this is so subjective, the 
meaning of “obscene” can vary widely from person to person.
67
 This 
would be problematic if criminal obscenity charges were commonly 
brought, but they are not.
68
 
C.  Buying and Selling Sex Legally 
Though commoditized sex may sometimes constitute expressive 
conduct, prostitution is either regulated as commerce or criminalized. 
When commoditized sex is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 
however, it becomes protected speech—commoditized sex that is 
legal, socially acceptable, and copyrighted. 
 
64 See, e.g., Obscenity and Pornography: Behavioral Aspects—Obscenity and 
Pornography Defined, L. LIBR. – AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/pages/1609 
/Obscenity-Pornography-Behavioral-Aspects-Obscenity-pornography-defined.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
65 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
66 See id.; Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, et al. in Support of 
Appellees, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (No. 96-511); see also Amy 
Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 700 (2007). 
67 The most frequently quoted Supreme Court opinion on obscenity is Justice Stewart’s 
“I know it when I see it” concurrence. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
68 See Bartow, supra note 14, at 821–22. 
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When it is not filmed, prostitution is illegal in most, though not all, 
U.S. jurisdictions.
69
 In regions where it is illegal, it is zealously 
prosecuted in some contexts but virtually ignored in others.
70
 Selling 
sex is far more likely to result in an arrest or criminal conviction than 
buying sex.
71
 Prostitutes and pimps are usually targeted, but johns 
ignored, based on choices made by law enforcement officials rather 
than the criminal code that is in effect.
72
 When it is filmed, the 
operative definitions change. The sellers of sex are “performers” 
rather than “prostitutes” and those who orchestrate the activities are 
“pornographers” rather than “johns” or “pimps.” 
For over two decades, obscenity prosecutions related to 
pornography have been very rare; the U.S. government has 
overwhelmingly ignored pornography as long as the performers in 
any given work are eighteen years old or over.
73
 State governments 
have largely followed suit because in California v. Freeman,
74
 the 
U.S. Supreme Court sharply curtailed states’ ability to regulate the 
production of pornography by declining to review the California 
Supreme Court’s decision that hiring and paying people to engage in 
sexual acts pursuant to the production of pornographic films did not 
constitute pandering under the relevant provision of the California 
Penal Code.
75
 This instantiated the perception that producing 
pornography is legal even in jurisdictions where prostitution is not. 
 
69 Daniel J. Franklin, Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 356–
57 (2007) (listing state prostitution statutes). 
70 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1726 
(2006) (“Police response times are slow citywide by national standards—and they’re worst 
in the highest-crime areas. And the officers patrolling those neighborhoods are the 
department’s least experienced.”) (citation omitted). 
71 Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Empirical Analysis of Street-Level 
Prostitution, 4–5 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics 
.uchicago.edu/pdf/Prostitution%205.pdf. 
72 See Sergio Herzog, The Lenient Social and Legal Response to Trafficking in Women: 
An Empirical Analysis of Public Perceptions in Israel, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 314 
(2008), available at http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/24/3/314; Elaine Pearson, Half-hearted 
Protection: What Does Victim Protection Really Mean for Victims of Trafficking in 
Europe?, 10 GENDER & DEV. 56 (2002). 
73 See Bartow, supra note 14, at 821–22 (observing a decline in adult obscenity charges 
during administration of George W. Bush). 
74 California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311 (1989). 
75 Id. at 1313 (Justice O’Connor acknowledging state interest in controlling prostitution 
but deferring to state law determination that paying for sexual performances for 
pornographic films is not pandering under state-law definition). 
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The impact of this Supreme Court non-decision has been profound. 
Acts that otherwise qualify as prostitution transmogrify into 
pornography when they are recorded. If a camera is present, an illegal 
act of selling sex becomes a legal exercise of free expression. That 
may sound facially absurd, but consider the recent holding in State v. 
Theriault, in which the legality of paying people to watch them have 
sex was at issue.
76
 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire overturned 
one of the defendant’s convictions for prostitution because it was 
based on his offering to pay a couple for having sexual intercourse 
while he videotaped them.
77
 However, the Theriault defendant was 
unable to successfully appeal another prostitution conviction under 
the same statute where he had simply “offered to pay [a] couple to 
engage in sexual intercourse with each other, and explained that he 
would need to watch them.”
78
 A request to pay two individuals to 
make a sexually explicit video was held to be protected under the free 
speech guarantees of the New Hampshire State Constitution.
79
 But 
the First Amendment offered no cognizable protection for mere 
voyeurism.
80
 The presence of a camera was the difference between 
legal and illegal conduct, pornography and prostitution, even though 
in both cases the couple was to be paid for having sex while an 
observer was present.
81
 
The camera-based divide between pornography and prostitution 
has important commercial and cultural ramifications.
82
 While it may 
be hard to imagine companies like General Motors, Google, Marriott, 
or Fox News openly operating brothels, their engagement in the 
pornography industry means that commercial sex that directly profits 
them is bought and sold.
83
 Pornography and prostitution are treated 
 
76 State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687 (N.H. 2008). 
77 Id. at 692. 
78 State v. Theriault, 949 A.2d 678, 679 (N.H. 2008). 
79 Theriault, 960 A.2d at 692. 
80 See Theriault, 949 A.2d at 681. 
81 Compare id. with Theriault, 949 A.2d. at 692. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993, 996–97 (2005) (“To distinguish 
pornography from prostitution, for example, California courts notwithstanding, is to deny 
the obvious: when you make pornography of a woman, you make a prostitute out of her.”). 
82 See generally Sherry F. Colb, The Legal Line Between Porn and Prostitution, 
CNN.COM (Aug. 12, 2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-12/justice/colb.pornography 
_1_prostitution-ring-sexual-services-pornography?_s=PM:LAW. 
83 See GAIL DINES, PORNLAND: HOW PORN HAS HIJACKED OUR SEXUALITY 51–53 
(2010). 
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disparately by these mainstream corporations because one is legally 
and culturally acceptable while the other is not, even though the 
constitutive sex acts may be identical. In both cases people are paid to 
have sex for the benefit of others, but pornography can be 
commoditized and consumed at a remote distance from the human 
bodies used in its production. Intellectual property laws play integral 
roles in this commoditization, offering to the creators and distributors 
of pornography the branding opportunities facilitated by trademarks 
and the incentives, legal protections, and artistic legitimacy associated 
with copyrights.
84
 
II 
THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF 
EXPRESSIVE SPEECH 
Copyright law is even more pornography-friendly than the First 
Amendment. The First Amendment will only protect pornography if it 
is not obscene or illegal for other reasons; for example, if it contains 
depictions of children. Copyright law offers protections to 
pornography no matter what material it contains.
85
 The First 
Amendment merely prevents the government from interfering in the 
creation, distribution and consumption of pornography that is not 
obscene or otherwise illegal. Copyright law actually incentivizes the 
creation and distribution of pornography and enables pornographers 
to  employ  government resources to prevent and punish infringing 
uses by government actors and private parties alike. 
When an adequately original work is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, it is a copyrighted commodity that can be bought or sold, 
licensed or traded.
86
 This is why even though copyright law facilitates 
the production and distribution of free speech in the form of fine art, 
literature, music, and drama, the Copyright Act, as written and 
interpreted, often manifests as a particularized form of commercial 
 
84 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 799 (discussing role of copyright in creating 
branding opportunities). 
85 See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (“[P]rotection of all writings, without regard to their content, is a 
constitutionally permissible means of promoting science and the useful arts.”). 
86 See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (setting out the 
requirements for copyright protection and regulating the many ways a copyrighted work 
can be exploited). 
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law.
87
 The relationship between the First Amendment and 
pornography is often characterized as freedom of speech, while the 
relationship between the Copyright Act and pornography is mostly, if 
not exclusively, about money. Pornography is no different than any 
other creative work in that regard. 
Originality, the essential requirement of copyrightability, is 
assessed in a content-specific manner, and the level of originality 
required to trigger copyright protection, both doctrinally and in 
practice, is low.
88
 As long as a work exhibits some improvement upon 
preexisting materials, the copyright holder can defend its unique 
creative aspects from unauthorized copying, subject to constraints 
such as fair use.
89
 The copyright holder owns the work’s words and 
images, not in an absolute manner as one might own real estate or 
chattels, but in a copyright sense. Anybody who wants to use the 
work substantively without potentially triggering an infringement suit 
needs to ask the copyright holder’s permission and pay her for the 
privilege; thus, the exchange requires an offer, acceptance, capacity, 
and consideration—the elements of a valid contract. The copyright 
holder is generally free to withhold permission, which freights any 
unauthorized use of her words or images with the threat of legal 
action in response. 
Copyright protections facilitate governmentally promulgated 
regulation of speech in ways one unfamiliar with contemporary 
copyright jurisprudence might understandably but incorrectly assume 
that the First Amendment did not allow. Copyright law establishes a 
legal framework for injunctions that chill and censor speech if the 
content of the speech infringes or potentially infringes a copyright, 
and damages awards that punish speakers who use copyrighted words, 
or words that are deemed too similar to copyrighted words. Despite 
this, First Amendment grounded objections to copyright-based 
 
87 Copyright law has been treated more like commerce than speech by the Supreme 
Court. See Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright 
Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633 (2004), available at http://www.wmitchell.edu 
/lawreview/Volume30/Issue5/3Okediji.pdf. 
88 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991); see also 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); cf. Bridgeman Art Libr., 
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
89 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (explaining fair 
use inquiry focus is whether and to what extent the allegedly offending work  is 
“transformative” and alters original work with new expression). 
BARTOW 10/4/2012  2:20 PM 
2012] Copyright Law and Pornography 21 
censorship have not found much traction in the courts.
90
 In Harper & 
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court explicitly 
held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted 
works of others, not even in small excerpted increments.
91
 Attempts 
to communicate uncopyrightable facts or ideas using alternative 
words or images can also be enjoined if these words or images are 
deemed substantially similar to copyright-protected expression.
92
 
Some courts and commentators perpetuate a facile trope about 
copyright law being nondiscriminatory with respect to content 
because copyright law can protect any kind of content that is 
adequately original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
93
 
But nothing about copyrights is content neutral. 
The Supreme Court may occasionally deploy the power of fair use 
to prevent copyright protections from trumping the First 
Amendment,
94
 but at most, fair use unambiguously carves out only 
limited and highly contextual speech rights with respect to contested 
words or images,
95
 and even those may only be available after 
expensive and protracted litigation. The late Justice William 
Rehnquist noted in his dissent in a flag burning case in 1974 that 
copyright law is an example of a constitutional  speech  restriction.
96
 
One scholarly take on his views is that “Copyright law restricts 
speech: It restricts you from writing, singing, painting, or otherwise 
communicating what you please. If your speech copies ours, and if 
the copying uses our ‘expression,’ not merely our ideas or facts, it can 
be enjoined and punished, civilly and sometimes criminally.”
97
 A 
 
90 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
91 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
92 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 
1986) (holding jeans maker enjoined from using stitching pattern substantially similar to 
those on the back of Levi’s jeans). 
93 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What 
Copyright Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
94 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994). 
95 Id. (“This is not, of course, to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim 
the cream and get away scot free. In parody, as in news reporting . . . context is everything, 
and the question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the 
original.”). 
96 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
97 Lemly & Volokh, supra note 90, at 165-66 (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 417) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
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little over a decade later a Supreme Court majority illustrated this 
point by holding in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises 
that fair use would not necessarily give a journalist the right to use 
brief verbatim quotes from the memoirs of a public figure in a news 
story.
98
 
Through the Copyright Office and the courts, the federal 
government already makes content-based decisions about the 
copyright worthiness of creative works. Some works are deemed 
inadequately creative to warrant copyright protection.
99
 Others may 
be treated as uncopyrightable because they contain infringing 
material.
100
 The artistic merit of a creative work is not supposed to 
drive administrative or judicial decisions about either copyrightability 
or the robustness of the scope of the copyright with which a work is 
vested.
101
 Lousy songs, awful novels, and ugly paintings get just as 
much copyright protection as fine melodies, riveting sagas, and 
beautiful pictures. Boring or inane works are accorded the same level 
of copyright protection that gripping and insightful ones receive. 
Political speech gets no more or less copyright protection than any 
other sort of speech. All this gives copyright law a thin veneer of 
content neutrality in the First Amendment sense, but that does not 
survive sustained analytical scrutiny.
102
 Both obscenity laws and 
copyright laws are content-based restrictions on speech.
103
  Copyright 
laws facilitate speech regulation by the government that takes the 
form of refereeing business transactions and adjudicating commercial 
disputes. In consequence, First Amendment considerations are often 
 
98 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) (finding 
no fair use by The Nation magazine where thirteen percent of article quotes original 
language from unpublished manuscript). 
99 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Brandir Int’l, 
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); John Muller & Co. v. 
N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986). 
100 See  Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Stallone, 
11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
101 See, e.g., Copyright and Fair Use Overview: Copyright Basics FAQ, STANFORD U. 
LIBRS. & ACADEMIC INFO. RES., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright_and_Fair_Use 
_Overview/chapter0/0-a.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (“It doesn’t matter if an author’s 
creation is similar to existing works, or even if it is arguably lacking in quality, ingenuity 
or aesthetic merit. So long as the author toils without copying from someone else, the 
results are protected by copyright.”). 
102 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. 
L. REV. 891, 897 (2002). 
103 See id. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 93. 
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minimized.
104
 Because copyright protection grants the copyright 
holder an exclusive right to specific forms of expression only, it does 
not, according to the Supreme Court, inherently impermissibly restrict 
free speech.
105
 But restrict free speech it can.
106
 In this author’s view, 
the effects of copyright laws are inadequately appreciated by 
mainstream media consumers. The First Amendment may be 
interpreted to confer a right to possess a particular work of 
pornography, but if someone’s copy is unauthorized, copyright laws 
may render that possession criminal. Illegal downloading is a form of 
socially deviant speech that pornographers themselves condemn and 
seek to arrest and eradicate when they enforce their copyrights. 
A copyright holder’s control over a work is not unqualified. 
Portions of otherwise copyrighted creative works are 
noncommoditizable through copyright for a host of policy reasons.
107
 
A copyright holder cannot monopolize facts or ideas, as doing so 
would disadvantage competitors and unduly discourage the creation 
of new works without sufficient compensatory benefits to society.
108
 
That may sound like a fairly straightforward limitation, but defining 
facts and ideas and coherently extricating them from the sticky grasp 
of copyrightable expression can be difficult.
109
 
Ambiguous conflations of facts, ideas, and putatively protectable 
expression may float outside the confines of copyright control 
through the merger and scènes à faire doctrines, which are supposed 
to prevent certain kinds of overreaching by copyright holders.
110
 But 
 
104 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985). 
105 E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (holding that “extension of 
existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment”). 
106 See, e.g., Rob Beshizza, DMCA Used To Try And Silence Movie Reviewer, WIRED 
(Jan. 14, 2008, 4:57 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/01/dmca-used-to-tr/; 
Rashmi Rangnath, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Uses the DMCA to Silence Critic, PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2721. 
107 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1130 (1990). 
108 See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A Unified Theory of 
Copyright, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 321–41 (2009). 
109 See Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992); see generally 
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). 
110 See Ginsburg, supra note 109; see also Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, 
and the End of the Scénes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 779, 781–83 (2006) (explaining no copyright protection is available “if an idea and 
the expression of the idea are so tied together that the idea and its expression are one”). 
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there are no guarantees. Some words and images can be controlled 
through copyright law, but others cannot.
111
 How much power a 
copyright holder wields is not known until a judge or jury rules. The 
scope of copyright protection is uncertain. Unauthorized uses are 
adjudicated individually and similar appropriations could drive 
different outcomes. In an infringement suit, a court makes highly 
content-specific determinations about which elements of a plaintiff’s 
work fit in the protected category and which do not, which 
unauthorized uses are fair and which are not, and when something 
facially different from protected expression such as a paraphrase is 
still too similar and can therefore be enjoined.
112
 Paraphrasing could 
constitute an infringement, while literal copying might be fair use. 
Uncertainty reigns. 
Simply sending a “takedown” notice under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) is a powerful non-content-neutral tool 
developed and backed by the federal government that a copyright 
holder can use to pressure an online content provider to remove 
expressive speech from an online venue.
113
 The incentives to comply 
with a takedown notice are powerful, and counterincentives are 
virtually nonexistent.
114
 The parry and thrust of the DMCA notice 
and takedown regime look a lot like, if not the prior restraint of 
speech, then at least almost contemporaneous silencing. Expressive 
speech is removed from a website in prudent response to 
representations about the copyrighted nature of its content. Silencing 
the speaker carries no risk to the silencer, but failing to silence the 
speaker renders an Internet service provider potentially liable for the 
illegal actions of third parties.
115
 The incentives all weigh in favor of 
 
111 Murray, supra note 110, at 790–91. 
112 Id. 
113 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, 11–13 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov 
/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
114 See Kurt Opsahl, YouTube Wins Summary Judgment in Viacom DMCA Lawsuit, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 23, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/06/youtube  
-wins-summary-judgment-viacom-dmca (“The DMCA safe harbors give service providers 
like YouTube a strong incentive to remove content upon receipt of a takedown notice 
(Viacom sent 100,000 notices to YouTube in one day; virtually all the videos were gone 
by the next business day). In exchange, those service providers are shielded from 
copyright infringement liability.”). 
115 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) broadly 
immunizes Internet service providers from civil liability based on claims related to 
content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998). 
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takedown but this does not, according to any court that has yet 
considered the question, rise to the level of censorship that implicates 
the First Amendment.
116
 
The Copyright Act already regulates speech in myriad ways that 
are obviously not content neutral. Denying copyright protection to 
harmful pornographic works would not additionally burden lawful 
speech in a manner that violates the First Amendment. Rather, it 
would simply reduce the government-provided incentives for the 
production and distribution of harmful pornography. 
III 
WHAT IS “NON-PROGRESSIVE” AND “NON-USEFUL” PORNOGRAPHY? 
A.  Pornography as Cultural Construct 
The difference in social status between men and women is both 
illustrated and reinforced by endemic highly sexualized depictions of 
women in the media. At the far end of a very long and dense 
continuum is hardcore pornography. As Catharine MacKinnon has 
eloquently explained, pornography reflects and reinforces the unequal 
and inferior position of women.
117
 Pornography has an impact on the 
media that is visible in advertisements for products that are not related 
to sex. Consider three illustrative examples. An ad for Arby’s 
positioned two round meat sandwiches in the place of breasts with a 
disembodied woman’s arms crossed over the burger-chest.
118
 Old 
Spice exhorts potential customers to “Keep it Clean,” next to an 
unsubtle picture of a woman suggestively licking an ice cream cone, 
as if performing fellatio, with the text, “She is only eating it because it 
tastes good and it is hot where she happens to be.”
119
 An 
advertisement for a Clinique skin moisturizer uses a common visual 
 
116 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The 
First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 
(2000); Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 397 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529 (2000). 
117 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
118 See Darren Rovell, Arby’s Scores in Swimsuit Issue, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/29139052 (describing the ad that appeared in the 2009 Sports 
Illustrated Swimsuit Edition). 
119 See CARMINE SARRACINO & KEVIN M. SCOTT, THE PORNING OF AMERICA 120 
(2008). 
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pornography trope with fluid splattered on a woman’s face.
120
 The 
cultural effects of pornography are felt by everyone.
121
 But it is the 
people who sell sex directly who are most deeply marginalized. Most 
of the people working as prostitutes or in pornography are doing so 
because they are subject to some form of coercion—actual or 
threatened violence and intimidation or financial coercion.
122
 A poor 
economic climate has driven more people into prostitution and 
 
120 See id. at 118. 
121 See Ana J. Bridges, Pornography’s Effects on Interpersonal Relationships 
(unpublished research paper, Dep’t. of Psychol., University of Arkansas), available at 
http://www.socialcostsofpornography.org/Bridges_Pornographys_Effect_on_Interpersonal
_Relationships.pdf; Ryan Singel, Internet Porn: Worse Than Crack?, WIRED (Nov. 19, 
2004), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/11/65772; cf. David Lee, 
What is the Influence of Pornography on Rape?, CALCASA (Mar. 19, 2010), 
http://calcasa.org/prevention/what-is-the-influence-of-pornography-on-rape/ (detailing two 
research papers that reach opposite conclusions about the effect of pornography on the rate 
of sexual assaults). 
122 See Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must 
Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 134 (2006) (“We found that prostitution was multitraumatic: 
71% [of prostitutes interviewed in multi-national study] were physically assaulted in 
prostitution; 63% were raped; 89% . . . wanted to escape prostitution, but did not have 
other options for survival”); Dorchen Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s 
Human Rights, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 136 (1993) (“[P]rostitution . . . isn’t about 
choice. Instead, prostitution is about the absence of meaningful choices . . . .”); Catharine 
A. Mackinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER AND L. 13 (1993), 
available at http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/mackinnon2.html; Melissa Farley, 
Human Trafficking and Prostitution, http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/faq/000175 
.html (“The conditions that make genuine consent possible are absent from prostitution: 
physical safety, equal power with johns and pimps, and real alternatives”); Prostitution 
FAQ, Human Trafficking and Prostitution, PROSTITUTION GENDERBERG, http://www 
.genderberg.com/phpNuke/modules.php?name=FAQ&myfaq=yes&id_cat=2&categories 
=Prostitution+FAQf (last visited Aug. 20, 2012). Max Waltman, Stockholm Univ. Dep’t 
of Psychology, Paper to Be Presented at the Swedish Political Science Ass’n (SWEPSA) 
Annual Meeting, Sept. 30 to Oct. 2, 2010: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: Legal 
Challenges to Pornography and Sex Inequality in Canada, Sweden, and the United States, 
available at http://www.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1315/1315857_waltman.pdf (“Although 
some question that pornography is produced under such coercive or violent conditions as 
those documented in this sample, a significant body of evidence below unfortunately 
shows this study was not an exception. Rather, violence, force, and coercive circumstances 
seem endemic in its production which, considering among other things the gender 
inequality in its consumption, suggest that it is strongly related to male social 
dominance.”). Cf. Chuck Neubauer, Most Human Trafficking Related to Prostitution, 
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/28/most  
-human-trafficking-related-to-prostitution/ (discussing a report by the U.S. Department of 
Justice stating that most human trafficking involves prostitution). 
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pornography because alternative avenues of employment have 
declined, and most of these people are women.
123
 
Johns, pimps, and prostitutes are all committing crimes in most 
jurisdictions of the United States, but prostitutes are 
disproportionately targeted for arrest by law enforcement officials.
124
 
Despite a few high profile exceptions, most johns are ignored or even 
protected by social norms that favor punishing and shaming 
prostitutes.
125
 
As explained previously, when a camera is brought into a room in 
which a commercial sex transaction is occurring, what was illegal 
prostitution suddenly becomes pornography, which is generally legal 
if all parties are eighteen or older, and which is protected under the 
auspices of dominant First Amendment jurisprudence.
126
 
Pornographers are much less likely than pimps to be arrested for 
arranging monetized sex acts, and are subject to far less governmental 
supervision or scrutiny than anyone involved in the production of 
mainstream movies or television programs.
127
 Pornographers enjoy a 
broad zone of autonomous anonymity, while at the same time the 
distribution of pornography strips the performers they film of visual 
and informational privacy, both legally and as a practical matter. The 
performers’ real names may be kept on record so that government 
actors can insure they are legally adults,
128
 and their faces and bodies 
may remain in Internet circulation in perpetuity.
129
 
 
123 See Kristi Jourdan, Ex-Prostitutes Walk Tough Road to Economic Freedom Amid 
Recession, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/news/ex   
-prostitutes-walk-tough-road-to-economic-freedom-amid-recession-82543682.html (last 
updated April 10, 2012, 10:44 AM); For 4, Life of Prostitution and Death by 1 Killer, 
CBS N.Y. (Jan. 29, 2011, 10:01 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/01/29/for-4-life   
-of-prostitution-and-death-by-1-killer/. 
124 See Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update 
on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 33 (2003), available 
at http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/pdf/Prostitutionin9Countries.pdf. 
125 See infra notes 144–51 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman case). 
127 See Donna M. Hughes, The Demand for Victims of Sex Trafficking (June 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/demand 
_for_victims.pdf; Max Waltman, Stockholm Univ. Dep’t of Psychology, Midwest Political 
Science Association Conference: The Ideological Obstacle: Charging Pornographers for 
Sexual Exploitation (Apr. 11–15, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2050290. 
128 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2006). See generally Ann Bartow, Why Hollywood Does Not 
Require “Saving” From the Recordkeeping Requirements Imposed by 18 U.S.C. Section 
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While prostitution is badly policed by the government in ways that 
disproportionately target women, pornography is barely regulated at 
all. Consumer-oriented statements about animal welfare can be seen 
on cans of tuna bearing “dolphin safe” labels,
130
 or general release 
movies that includes notices that that no animals were harmed during 
the making of the film. In stark contrast, pornographic works are 
often advertised in ways that highlight actual violence that was done 
to performers during production, such as “bloody first times,” 
“blondes getting slammed,” “big mutant dicks rip small chicks,” and 
“men fucking that teen virgin bitch’s ass so hard she couldn’t sit for 
days.”
131
 Apparently, this is an effective way to sell pornography to 
average pornography consumers. One wonders how the same 
audience would respond to cans of tuna bearing labels that said, “Now 
with more brutally slaughtered dolphins than ever!” It may be that 
pornography consumers falsely believe all pornography performances 
are voluntary and consensual, but the violent sales pitches 
compellingly suggest that it is more likely consumers derive extra 
pleasure from the possibility of real women’s suffering. 
Many works of mainstream pornography promote a dangerously 
distorted vision of female sexual response. Many of these works are 
produced in ways that endanger the health and safety of the 
performers, with practices ranging from unprotected sex acts among 
multiple partners in ways that are especially likely to facilitate the 
spread of diseases, to heavy-handed, body-damaging, unsimulated 
violence.
132
 
The U.S. Department of State’s June 2007 Trafficking in Persons 
Report
 
noted that trafficked women and children are the primary 
 
2257, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 43, 43 (2008), available at http://yalelawjournal.org 
/images/pdfs/701.pdf. 
129 Once information is posted to the Internet, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remove 
it.  Jeffrey Rosen calls this the “infinite memory” of the web.  Jeffrey Rosen, The Web 
Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2010, at MM30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
130 Dolphin Safe Tuna: Consumers, EARTH ISLAND INST., http://www.earthisland.org 
/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
131 A reader can verify this statement by entering these phrases into an Internet search 
engine. 
132 See Maria de Cesare, Rxxx: Resolving the Problem of Performer Health and Safety 
in the Adult Film Industry, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 684 (2006); Christina Jordan, The 
XXX-Files: Cal/OSHA’s Regulatory Response to HIV in the Adult Film Industry, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 421, 424 (2005). 
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victims of commercial sexual exploitation.
133
 The Report emphasized 
the commercial sexual exploitation that human trafficking makes 
possible, decrying the forced prostitution of trafficked women and 
children. The Report also references child pornography multiple 
times, but the forced participation of women aged eighteen or over in 
pornography is not mentioned at all. There is plenty of evidence that 
women who are “prostituted” (to use the terminology of the Report) 
are also force-filmed so that videos of their rapes can be distributed 
commercially, but this category of sexual exploitation did not merit 
mention by the State Department’s Report, though surely no one 
believes that women held captive and forced into prostitution are 
contemporaneously appearing in pornography voluntarily. 
However, pornography is a very lucrative product for mainstream 
American corporations
134
 that are unlikely to open brothels. They will 
sell only copyrighted sex to their clients. Pornography is prostitution 
sanitized by physical remoteness from the commoditized bodies and 
by the independent contractors who provide companies like Google 
and General Motors with plausible deniability when people are 
harmed during its production. 
Pornographic pictures and movies in which the humiliation of 
women is the central theme, fusing sexual desire with cruelty, are 
extremely common in the United States.
135
 One of the few large-scale 
academic studies of pornography on the Internet, now over a dozen 
years old, ascertained that women are used disproportionately to men 
in violating ways, such as being subjected to bestiality.
136
 The 
aggressive, vitriolic, and highly personal backlash against this study 
by libertarian organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation is 
undoubtedly responsible for the paucity of interest in pornography 
 
133 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf. 
134 See DINES, supra note 83; see also supra note 14. 
135 See, e.g., THE PRICE OF PLEASURE: PORNOGRAPHY, SEXUALITY & RELATIONSHIPS 
(Media Educ. Found. 2008). 
136 Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey 
of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million 
Times By Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 
83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1898–1901 (1995); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and 
Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83 
GEO. L.J. 1959, 1963 (1995). 
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research.
137
 Sociologist Diana Russell has also argued that 
researchers avoid or downplay research that negatively characterizes 
pornography for professional reasons  because being pro-pornography 
is a more lucrative career strategy than exposing the harms of 
pornography.
138
 Linda Williams, an academic in film studies, has 
stressed the need for more scholarly analysis of pornography
139
; 
others have echoed this sentiment as well.
140
 
Given the pornography industry’s production of relentlessly sexist, 
degrading, and racist
141
 photos, films, and websites, one might expect 
politically liberal people to be receptive to critiques of pornography, 
but one would be very wrong.
142
 Rather than open-minded 
intellectual curiosity, criticisms of pornography are met with 
accusations of prudery, censoriousness, and alignment with the 
 
137 See Peter H. Lewis, The Internet Battles a Much-Disputed Study on Selling 
Pornography Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1995, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/1995/07/17/business/tech-net-internet-battles-much-disputed-study-selling                 
-pornography-line.html; David Farber, IP: Martin Rimm and the Anti-Porn Activists – 
From the EFFector, INTERESTING-PEOPLE (Oct. 20, 1995, 4:39 PM), http://www 
.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/199510/msg00056.html. 
138 Diana E. H. Russell, The Experts Cop Out, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY: FEMINIST 
VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 151 (Diana E. H. Russell ed., 1993). 
139 Linda Williams, Porn Studies: Proliferating Pornographies On/Scene: An 
Introduction, in PORN STUDIES 1 (Linda Williams ed., 2004). 
140 See Hughes, supra note 127; Daniel Linz et al., Civil Liberties and Research on the 
Effect of Pornography, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY (Peter Suedfeld & Philip E. 
Tetlock eds., 1992), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/malamuth/pdf/92PSP 
_C10.pdf; Neil M. Malamuth & Victoria Billings, The Functions and Effects of 
Pornography: Sexual Communications Versus the Feminist Models in Light of Research 
Findings, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 
1986), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/malamuth/pdf/86PME_C5.pdf. 
141 See, e.g., Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo Pornography and the 
Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 283 (2006); Gail Dines, 
King Kong and the White Woman: Hustler Magazine and the Demonization of Black 
Masculinity, 4 J. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 291 (1998), available at http://www 
.hustlingtheleft.com/CRAPP_E_LIB/dines.html. 
142 See, e.g., Danny Scoccia, Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?, 
106 ETHICS 776 (July 1996); Gail Dines, How Some Men React When They Think You 
Want to Take Away Their Porn: Penn, Porn and Me, COUNTERPUNCH (June 23, 2008), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/dines06232008.html. But see The Price of Pleasure: 
Pornography, Sexuality, and Relationships: Noam Chomsky on Pornography (Media 
Educ. Found. 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNlRoaFTHuE; but 
see also Robin Wilson, Tenured Professor is Placed on Leave After Showing a Film About 
Pornography, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article 
/Tenured-Professor-Is-Placed-on/131607/?key=Tmh6JAI7NyAXYSpnZjdBZDoAOiM 
4YR17YH9Nbnl/blFQFA%3D%3D (reporting that a professor was punished for showing 
The Price of Pleasure, which is very critical of pornography,  to her sociology class).  
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political right wing.
143
 The liberal perspective seems to be that 
feminists should not attack pornography because social 
archconservatives attack pornography, and they cannot possibly have 
the correct view of this (or any) issue.
144
 But right-wing religious 
fundamentalist cultural warriors do not evidence any particular 
driving passion to regulate pornography. Pornography’s widespread 
existence seems very useful to them culturally as a mechanism to 
illustrate the depravity of liberals.
145
 It has been this author’s strong 
impression that they rarely exhibit concern about the people damaged 
during the production of pornography. Their agenda actually appears 
to be very different: governmental regulation of sex and interpersonal 
relationships; government-based persecution of homosexuals; legal 
restrictions upon access to contraceptives and to instruments of sexual 
pleasure, such as vibrators; and the re-illegalization of abortion.
146
 
Principled expressions of concern about the harms of pornography 
production from either the left or right are rare indeed. 
In this author’s view, prostitution is also tolerated and normalized 
within mainstream American society. But because prostitution is 
generally illegal, the intersections between law and the people 
involved with the industry are different, even though some women 
who perform in pornography also sell sex directly to consumers
147
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I have the right to choose abortion, then I have the right to choose to have sex for the 
camera. Sexual freedom is the flip side of the coin of reproductive choice.”). 
145 See, e.g., Whitney Strub, Perversion for Profit: Citizens for Decent Literature and 
the Arousal of an Antiporn Public in the 1960s, 15 J. HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 258 (2006), 
available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_sexuality/v015/15.2 
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ABOUT.COM (Oct. 20, 2009), http://atheism.about.com/b/2009/10/20/christian-attitudes     
-towards-sex-pornography.htm; Green Point, Hotel Porn Gets Spanking From Religious 
Right: Conservatives Push Marriott to Drop Pay-Per-View Sex Flicks, NEWSER (July 23, 
2008, 9:20 PM), http://www.newser.com/story/33072/hotel-porn-gets-spanking-from         
-religious-right.html. 
146 See generally CULTURE WARS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISSUES, VIEWPOINTS, AND 
VOICES (Roger Chapman ed., 2009). 
147 JoAnna, Prostitution in Las Vegas, WHYGO LAS VEGAS, http://www.lasvegaslogue 
.com/prostitution (“Former and current porn stars sometimes base themselves at the 
brothels for a week or two at a time, and they can charge $1,000 or more.”) (last visited 
July 4, 2012). 
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and many johns are probably also pornography users.
148
 The threat of 
arrest or exposure impacts both the providers and consumers of 
commoditized sex. Men who are exposed as patrons of prostitutes 
(such as former New York Governor Elliot Spitzer
149
 and former 
Dean of the Villanova School of Law Mark Sargent)
150
 are publicly 
shamed, but the impact of this may be only temporary. Spitzer 
resigned as Governor of New York, but is now enjoying a high-
profile media career.
151
 Sargent resigned his Deanship, but he 
avoided criminal charges by helping the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania send the women who had sexually serviced him to 
jail.
152
 
Women culturally identified as prostitutes are also publicly 
shamed,
153
 but arguably that is the least of their problems. They are 
arrested and jailed at much higher rates than male pimps or johns and 
are extremely vulnerable to violence and coercion.
154
 Due to the 
 
148 See Richard Tewksbury & Seana Golder, Why Do Johns Use Pornography? 
Predicting Consumption of Pornography by Clients of Street Level Prostitutes, 2 
SOUTHWEST J. CRIM. L. 101 (2005), available at http://swacj.org/swjcj/archives 
/2.2/Tewksbury.pdf ; Leslie Bennetts, The John Next Door, NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2011, 
1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/17/the-growing-demand-for  
-prostitution.html;  
149 See Emperors Club: All About Eliot Spitzer’s Alleged Prostitution Ring, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2008, 11:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03 
/10/emperors-club-all-about-e_n_90768.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 1:25 PM). 
150 See Jeff Blumenthal, Villanova Dean Resigned Over Prostitution, PHILADELPHIA 
BUS. J. (July 7, 2009, 11:36 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/blogs/law 
/2009/07/villanova_dean_resigned_over_prostitution.html?surround=etf (last modified 
Oct. 16, 2010, 3:40 AM); Gina Passarella, Questions Arise After Law School Dean’s 
Resignation in Wake of Prostitution Investigation, LAW.COM (July 7, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432042292&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial 
&bu=Law.com&pt=LAWCOM%20Newswire&cn=NW_20090707&kw=Questions%20 
Arise%20After%20Law%20School%20Dean%27s%20Resignation%20in%20Wake%20 
of%20Prostitution%20Investigation&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
151 See Jan Hoffman, Spitzer’s Long Road to Redemption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at 
E1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/fashion/08Spitzer.html?_r=1 
&adxnnl=1&ref=style&adxnnlx=1298045180-PTPxe9qf1azDCzdD5bLdQQ; Brian 
Montopoli, Elliot Spitzer Gets Primetime CNN Show, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2010, 11:29 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008567-503544.html. 
152 See Kathleen BradyShea, Ex-Dean Helped Police, Report Says, PHILLY.COM (July 
03, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-07-03/news/25288787_1_sargent-prostitution     
-ring-customer. 
153 See Katie Escherich, Ashley Dupré: ‘I’ve Made So Many Mistakes’, ABC NEWS 
(Nov. 21, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=6302149&page=1. 
154 See Gene Johnson, New Murder Charge Filed in Seattle in Green River Killings; 
Ridgway Won’t Face Death Penalty, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2011), 
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illegality of their livelihood, they cannot expect protection from 
police officers, and instead are often exploited by them.
155
 
But there is little reason to believe that wholesale legalization of 
prostitution would improve the lives of women who sell sex. The fact 
that pornography production is legal does not mean that performing in 
pornography is safe; quite the contrary, as is explained below.
156
 In 
countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Israel, Mexico, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom where prostitution is legal, 
women working legally as prostitutes
157
 still suffer from high rates of 
violence and substance abuse.
158
 In addition, high rates of demand 
combined with greed foster sex trafficking and a giant and extremely 
lucrative illegal prostitution trade carried on outside the strictures of 
government regulations within these jurisdictions.
159
 Women infected 
with HIV cannot work legally as prostitutes, but they still have bodies 
that men are willing to buy. Women who sell sex legally in brothels 
that actually care about their health and well-being may not have to 
submit to unprotected sex, or to sex acts they find distasteful or 
worse, but the customers making these demands can simply go to 
other “providers”; those without any power or options at all. 
 
http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=115501659 (reporting how a 
serial killer “preyed upon women and girls at the margins of society—runaways, 
prostitutes and drug addicts”). 
155 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Empirical Analysis of 
Street-Level Prostitution (2008), available at http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf 
/Prostitution%205.pdf. 
156 See infra Part III.B.4. 
157 100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies, PROCON.ORG, http://prostitution 
.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772 (last updated Dec. 12, 2011, 10:26 
AM). 
158 E.g., Kimberly Schupp, Another Craigslist Killer? Bodies of 4 Women ID’ed, 
WISTV.COM (Jan. 25, 2011, 8:14 AM), http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S 
=13903767 (last updated Feb. 22, 2011, 8:41 AM); see also M.L. Burnette et al., 
Prevalence and Health Correlates of Prostitution Among Patients Entering Treatment for 
Substance Use Disorders, 65 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/PSYCH/11858/yoa70078_337_344.pdf. 
159 See Kevin Bales, Because She Looks Like a Child, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, 
MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 207, 226–28 (Barbara Ehrenreich & 
Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) (noting that the exportation of enslaved prostitutes is 
a robust business in Thailand, supplying brothels in Japan, Europe (mentioning 
Switzerland and Germany particularly) and America); SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL 
VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL SEX TRADE 152, 173 (2009). 
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Pornography and prostitution are cruelly symbiotic. One drives 
demand for the other, and there is little practical difference between 
prostitution and performing in pornography. In pornography a 
director or pornographer is in control of the sex; in prostitution a 
client or john is, and often a pimp as well. Addressing the harms that 
are inflicted on even voluntary performers involved in the 
manufacturing of pornography justifies regulating the production of 
pornography. It does not require censorship of content except to the 
extent necessary to reduce disease transmission and the infliction of 
other physical injuries. Nonpornographic audiovisual works are 
generally created subject to the costs and logistical constraints 
imposed by industry norms, regulations, and legislation that establish 
minimum levels of health and safety considerations accorded 
performers and stunt people.
160
 Simply leaving them subject to the 
base line negligence avoidance incentives and injury compensation 
frameworks provided by tort law was deemed inadequate.
161
 
Pornography performers should receive the same level of concern and 
protection, as they are no less worthy and no less human. 
B.  Toward a Content-Based Focus on the Constitutionality of 
Copyright Protecting Individual Works of Pornography 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to promote 
only the progress of science and useful arts through copyright 
legislation.
162
 Congress itself has never specifically taken up the issue 
 
160 See Nikki Finke, Feds Fine ‘Spider-Man – Broadway’ Production Company For 
Cast Injuries, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://www.deadline.com 
/2011/03/feds-fine-spider-man-broadway-production-company-for-cast-injuries/; Karen 
Idelson, High Stakes in Flying Game: Tech Tussle: Aerial Stunt Pros Stand Up for Safety, 
VARIETY (Mar. 9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118033594; Ann 
Oldenburg, Still Willing to Take the Fall, USA TODAY (June 6, 2003, 1:42 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2003-06-05-stunt_x.htm. 
161 See, e.g., Safety Bulletins: Recommended by Industry-Wide Labor-Management 
Safety Committee for the Motion Picture and Television Industry, CSATF, 
http://www.csatf.org/bulletintro.shtml (last visited July 4, 2012); Michael McCann, Stunt 
Injuries and Fatalities Increasing, available at http://www.uic.edu/sph/glakes 
/harts1/HARTS_library/stunts.txt (last visited July 4, 2012) (providing this and other 
articles on stunt safety). But see Joan Whitley, OSHA Not Reviewing Death of Stagehand, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 27, 2011; 7:36 AM), available at http://www.lvrj.com/news 
/osha-not-reviewing-death-of-stagehand-114707049.html. 
162 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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of whether a creative work, otherwise eligible for copyright 
protection, might be denied as a consequence of the work’s lack of 
progressiveness or usefulness. Nor has it addressed the 
copyrightability of pornography.
163
 
Before 1979, pornographers did not attempt to reap the benefits of 
the Copyright Act. Copying and attribution norms were driven by the 
business practices of organized crime.
164
 Then in Mitchell Brothers 
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, the Fifth Circuit held that 
obscenity was not a defense to copyright infringement because 
nothing in the Copyright Act of 1909 precluded the copyrighting of 
obscene materials.
165
 The Fifth Circuit specifically used the term 
“obscenity” rather than “pornography,” and concluded that holding 
obscene materials copyrightable furthered the pro-creativity purposes 
of the Copyright Act and of congressional copyright power 
generally.
166
 
The Mitchell Brothers court also asserted that the First Amendment 
and copyright are “mutually supportive,” writing: “The financial 
incentive provided by copyright encourages the development and 
exchange of ideas which furthers the first amendment’s purpose of 
promoting the ‘exposition of ideas.’”
167
 The article quoted by the 
court linked this to a right to reach an audience or readership that is 
economically facilitated by copyright protections.
168
 
The Mitchell Brothers court expressed enthusiastic support for 
increasing incentives for the production and distribution of 
pornography without expressing concern for any negative 
consequences. In the years following the Mitchell Brothers decision, 
courts agonized over the costs and benefits of extending copyright 
protections to categories of works such as computer game 
 
163 See Bartow, supra note 14, at 833–35. 
164 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON 
PORNOGRAPHY, ORGANIZED CRIME INVOLVEMENT IN PORNOGRAPHY pt. 4, ch. 4 (1986), 
available at http://www.porn-report.com/404-organized-crime-and-pornography.htm; 
Mitchell Brothers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell_brothers (last visited 
July 4, 2012). 
165 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the now superseded Copyright Act of 
1909 was the applicable statute). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 857 n.8 (quoting The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed 
Test, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1158, 1177–78 (1977) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). 
168 Id. 
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interfaces,
169
 where any harm from an overly expansive construction 
of copyright was likely to be strictly economic in nature. Pornography 
apparently presented a much easier case. 
Three years later, in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy,
 
the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the Mitchell Brothers court’s reasoning unquestioningly, 
relying on an endorsement by Nimmer on Copyright, which it referred 
to as “[t]he leading treatise on copyright.”
170
 Although Mitchell 
Brothers was the only case on point at that time, the Jartech court 
observed that “Nimmer also considers Mitchell Brothers to represent 
the prevailing view on this issue,”
171
 and followed the prescriptions 
of the copyright treatise by rote.
172
 
In 2002, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., a federal 
judge stated that the protection of pornographic copyrights was 
“consistent with the public interest.”
173
 In 2004, in Nova Products, 
Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc.,
 
a third court decided to follow Mitchell 
Brothers, observing: 
In its well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, the Fifth Circuit [in 
Mitchell Brothers] reviewed the history of the copyright legislation 
and found that all-inclusive language of the Copyright Act of 1909, 
17 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (repealed), which encompassed “all the 
writings of an author,” did not bespeak of an obscenity exception to 
copyright protection.
174
 
The author of Nimmer on Copyright, David Nimmer, appears to 
view the issue of the copyrightability of pornography as somewhat of 
a joke, having written a mocking fictional account of a debate over 
the issue set in the year 2016.
175
 Yet courts are not in complete 
 
169 See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 
1992); Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data East Corp., No. C 93-3259 WHO, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5306 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 
999 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
170 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982). 
171 Id. 
172 See generally Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 581 (2004) (offering a critique of courts’ over-reliance on the Nimmer treatise). 
173 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
174 Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3850 (HB), 02 Civ. 6277 (HB), 
03 Civ. 3379 (HB), 03 Civ. 4259 (HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 30, 2004). 
175 David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Law Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 
1282 (2004) (providing analysis of fictive “The Gazette Memmilania, Gm.; Jan. 14, 
2018”); cf. DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE DMCA 
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accord on this matter. In 1998, Judge Martin of the Southern District 
of New York refused to grant a copyright infringement-grounded 
preliminary injunction or pretrial impoundment and seizure order for 
movies he believed to be obscene.
176
 He concluded that, “[g]iven the 
clearly criminal nature of plaintiff’s operations, it is self-evident that 
the Court should not use its equitable power to come to plaintiff’s 
assistance,” and he refused to commit the resources of the U.S. 
Marshals Service “to support the operation of plaintiff’s pornography 
business.”
177
 The holding reflected an assumption that obscene works 
were not eligible for copyright protection in the interval between 
1790, when the first U.S. copyright law took effect, until almost two 
hundred years later, when the Mitchell Brothers case was decided.
178
 
1.  Defining and Promoting Progress 
Legal scholars have debated the meanings of various textual 
components of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution quite vigorously.
179
 Many older cases talk about 
“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . the useful Arts” in connection with 
copyright, but the modern view is that the “Progress of the useful 
Arts” refers to technology and therefore patents, while the part of the 
clause relevant to copyrights is the part that invites Congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science,” with science meaning 
knowledge.
180
 This has the advantage of using the same order, 
copyright then patent, in both halves of the clause.
181
 
 
336–37 (2003) (arguing that online pornography is analogous to a peep show with a 
legitimate claim to an admission price). 
176 Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
177 Id. at 175. 
178 The copyrightability of pornography is the subject of legal debate currently. See 
Chris Matyszczyk, Copyright Defendant: Porn May Be, Um, Unprotected (Feb. 6, 2012, 
5:42 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-57372240-71/copyright-defendant-porn     
-may-be-um-unprotected/?part=rss&subj=latest-news&tag=title. 
179 See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” 
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing The 
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001). 
180 See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
7 (2002) (explaining the meaning of “science” as used in Constitution). 
181 Thanks to Jessica Litman for this observation and framing of the issue. 
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Non-progressive, non-useful works cannot constitutionally receive 
copyright protection and the Copyright Act could be modified to 
make this explicit. I propose the following definition: 
A “non-progressive, non-useful” work is a pornographic work in 
which the level of originality or creativity is low, but the likelihood 
that harms were inflicted on living beings during the production of the 
work, or the risk of harms resulting from distribution and 
consumption of the work, is high. 
Specific categories of works may be presumptively “non-
progressive” and “non-useful.” When the Supreme Court ruled in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003 that the 1998 Copyright Term Extension 
Act did not exceed constitutional boundaries with respect to the 
“limited times” restraint upon Congressional copyright powers, it 
signaled a high level of deference to Congress in the copyright 
context.
182
 The Court reinforced this jurisprudential position when it 
held that Congress could constitutionally restore copyright protection 
to works that were in the public domain in Golan v. Holder.
183
 If the 
proposed change to the Copyright Act was analyzed as an exercise of 
power under the Copyright Clause, it could withstand constitutional 
challenges
184
 even though it might further fragment what little 
coherence copyright law retains.
185
 
As a practical matter of law and economics, this proposal rests 
heavily upon the assumption that the benefits of reducing monetary 
incentives for producing non-useful and non-progressive pornography 
outweigh the additional costs inflicted upon those who have already 
been harmed by corresponding incentives to increase the distribution 
of existing works. Harms accrue to a person who has already been 
abused in the production of pornography when that pornography is 
distributed. More extensive distributional harm is inflicted when the 
 
182 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (“The CTEA is a rational exercise of the 
legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On this point, the Court defers 
substantially to Congress. . . . The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically 
makes, judgments the Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”). 
183 Golan v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/case   
-files/cases/golan-v-holder/ (“Holding: Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause.”). 
184 Cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F. 3d 1076, 1095 (2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 
(2011) (“In sum, Congress acted within its authority under the Copyright Clause in 
enacting Section 514 . . . Section 514 does not violate plaintiffs’ freedom of speech under 
the First Amendment because it advances an important governmental interest . . . .”). 
185 See Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Law Comprehesibly, supra note 175. 
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rate of distribution increases. If stripping certain pornographic works 
of copyright protections causes their production to decline, but 
demand remains the same, existing works become more valued and 
will circulate more widely. People who have already been victimized 
will thus bear some of the burden of reducing the number of future 
victims. But the likelihood that they will be victimized further in the 
production of new harmful works will also decline. In other words, a 
smaller number of works would be circulated more widely, bringing 
greater harms to the people traumatized by the distribution of those 
works. But disincentivizing future harmful works would reduce the 
total number of people subject to this abusive treatment overall. And 
even the people injured by the circulation of existing works would 
benefit if the production of new works further victimizing them were 
derailed by a lack of economic incentives. 
I expect the more virulent objections to this proposal to come from 
people who call themselves liberal. One might expect left-identifying 
observers to experience intense cognitive dissonance when speech 
seems to inflict harms upon vulnerable people whom, as liberals, they 
might actually care about in other contexts. But it is an instantiated 
part of the liberal canon that the “worst” speech should receive the 
most protection from the First Amendment, victims of the speech 
notwithstanding. That the negative consequences of a vibrant First 
Amendment fall more harshly upon women than men has made little 
difference so far to most of the free speech theorists regarded as 
important culturally or even within legal academia. There are, 
however, some specific categories of pornography in which at least 
some of the harms might be recognizable to even ardent libertarians: 
child pornography, crush pornography, and revenge pornography. 
Production of these works should not be incentivized or rewarded 
with copyrights or the associative benefits. In addition, any 
pornography in which the performers are engaged in unsimulated acts 
that are coerced or compromise their health and safety should also be 
denied copyright protections. I concede at the outset that establishing 
the boundaries of these categories is vexingly complicated, but 
important tasks are rarely easy. 
2.  Child Pornography 
One hugely complicating variable with this category is the fact that 
people have widely differing opinions about what constitutes child 
pornography. Defining child pornography for purposes of eligibility 
for copyright protection would be no harder than it is in the First 
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Amendment milieu, but it might not be any easier or less contested 
either. Audiovisual depictions of real children engaged in explicit sex 
acts can be unambiguously described as child pornography. At the 
other end of the continuum, however, are works like still photographs 
of fully or mostly clothed teenagers who are posed in stances or 
contexts that strike some observers as sexualized. The lines between 
legal treatment of children as sex objects and illegal child 
pornography can be blurry.
186
 
The children depicted in pornography made with living performers 
are generally treated as victims and the consumers of child 
pornography as criminals, and rightly so. Pedophilia acted out in real 
space poses serious dangers to children and should be discouraged by 
every legal tool available, including exclusion from copyright 
protections. This may be largely symbolic, as no holder of copyright 
in a work that unambiguously constitutes child pornography has to 
date legally asserted copyrights or brought an infringement action.
187
 
Given the shadowy nature of the industry due to fear of arrest, it 
seems unlikely that unambiguous works of child pornography in 
which real children are depicted have even been registered with the 
Copyright Office.
188
 
Some observers argue that there is a moral panic about the 
sexualization of children that manifests itself through hyperaggressive 
prosecution of anyone associated with producing, distributing, or 
consuming child pornography.
189
 Certainly the use of the age of the 
subject as the single bright line that divides creative works with any 
sort of sexual aspect into one of two stark categories: “acceptable” 
 
186 See SARRACINO & SCOTT, supra note 119, at 20–29. 
187 Based on the author’s extensive research. See also Court: Child Porn Victims Can 
Get Restitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 1, 2012, 4:23 PM), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/10/01/us/ap-us-child-porn-paying-victims.html 
?hp&_r=0. The possibility of restitution claims make it even less likely that an “author” 
will assert copyright in child pornography. 
188 Pornography using adults who look like children or computer generated children 
may be registered, though its legality may be uncertain. See generally James Joyner, 
Supreme Court Upholds Virtual Child Porn Law, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (May 19, 
2008), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/supreme_court_upholds_virtual_child_porn 
_law/; David Stout, Supreme Court Upholds Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 
20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/washington/19cnd-scotus.html. 
189 See Jesse P. Basbaum, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: 
A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (2010); Melissa 
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or 
Political Rhetoric?, 22 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 545 (2011). 
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and “profoundly unacceptable, and also disgusting and criminal” is 
deeply problematic.
190
 As a definitional matter, drawing consistent 
and principled lines about what does and does not constitute child 
pornography is a daunting proposition in any context, copyright 
eligibility most definitely included. 
The average age of entry into both pornography and prostitution in 
the United States is twelve years old.
191
 In sharp contrast to children 
depicted in pornography, children who work as prostitutes are often 
treated as criminals,
192
 while the johns that patronize them are 
prosecuted much less frequently.
193
 Sometimes the johns are 
perceived by law enforcement actors as being victims of the seductive 
wiles of the child prostitutes.
194
 The notion that commoditized sex 
between children and adults is less damaging if it is not recorded by a 
camera defies credulity. There may not be a lasting public record of 
the event, but that does not undo acts of violence and victimization. It 
may actually be less risky for men to actually rape prostituted 
children than it is to possess photographs of other people raping 
prostituted children. The ugly and profound disparity between the 
ways child pornography and child prostitution are treated by the 
criminal justice system severely undermines any claim that the zero 
tolerance approach toward child pornography is aimed at protecting 
children.
195
 But at least as a matter of rhetorical consistency, 
 
190 MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 998 (“The majority of adults enter the industry as 
children and are exploited in ways that do not disappear when they reach the age of 
majority, including through materials in which children are used as women and women 
infantilized as children.”). 
191 Child Prostitution: Domestic Sex Trafficking of Minors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/prostitution.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011); Sexual 
Trafficking, WASH. ST. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.atg.wa.gov/Human 
Trafficking/SexTrafficking.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
192 As Rebecca Tushnet astutely pointed out to me, the contrast blurs when girls are 
prosecuted for “sexting,” sending pictures of themselves that fit the legal definition of 
child pornography and then being arrested for it. See generally John A. Humbach, 
‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010). 
193 Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and 
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1075, 1103 (2011). 
194 See MARY ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING 
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–1920 33 (1995) 
(detailing how state legislators “assigned the image of female depravity to working-class 
women, depicting working girls, servants, and prostitutes as licentious seducers of men”). 
195 See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 
213 (2001) (arguing that “[t]he growth of child pornography law has opened up a whole 
arena for the elaborate exploration of children as sexual creatures”). 
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declaring child pornography beyond the bounds of constitutional 
copyright protection because it is not useful accomplishes something, 
though admittedly it may be a very small advance indeed. 
Finally, though it is well beyond the scope of this Article, some 
hard questions need to be asked about why society seems to tolerate 
child prostitution so much more readily than child pornography.
196
 A 
child caught selling sex will often be arrested for it, despite clear 
indicia that she has been coerced into it. People caught buying sex 
from child prostitutes may only be punished lightly, or not at all, even 
with evidence the child was forced into the situation.
197
 Yet if the 
event is photographed, recorded on video, or filmed, the child is far 
less likely to be arrested and has an improved likelihood of being 
viewed and treated as a victim. Conterminously, people caught 
viewing or possessing child pornography are often harshly punished 
well beyond what might have befallen them had they had sexual 
contact with the children themselves. The wrongs perpetrated against 
child prostitutes are in many respects the same as those inflicted upon 
children in pornography. All that is missing is fixation in a tangible 
medium of expression and the copyright-protected commoditization 
this facilitates. That having sex with children is treated as less illegal 
and viewed as more socially acceptable than viewing images of other 
people having sex with children is baffling and unjustifiable. 
3.  Crush Pornography 
A federal statute formerly in effect provided that “[w]hoever 
knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty 
with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign 
commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”
198
 It was passed because 
 
196 For a discussion of the statistics on prosecution of child sex offenders, see Mark 
Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 
2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1, 1 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf (“During 2006, 3,661 suspects were referred to U.S. 
attorneys for child sex exploitation offenses. Child pornography constituted 69% of 
referrals, followed by sex abuse (16%) and sex transportation (14%).”) (emphasis added). 
197 See Caroline Heldman, No Jail Time for Lawrence Taylor, MS. MAG. BLOG (Jan. 
24, 2011), http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2011/01/24/no-jail-time-for-lawrence-taylor/ 
(discussing football linebacker Lawrence Taylor paying $300 to have sex with sixteen-
year-old girl who had been given black eye and punched by her pimp before encounter). 
198 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), invalidated by United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 
(2010). 
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while all individual states criminalize cruelty to animals, none has a 
statute that prohibits the sale of depictions of cruelty to animals.
199
 So 
distributors of “crush porn,” in which animals were tortured, could 
not be effectively prosecuted because human participants could not be 
identified if the faces of the women inflicting torture on animals in 
crush porn were not shown, and neither the location of filming nor the 
date of the activity was ascertainable by scrutinizing the pornography 
itself. Defendants arrested for violating a state cruelty to animals 
statute in connection with the production or sale of crush porn could 
successfully assert as a defense that the state could not prove its 
jurisdiction over the place where the acts occurred. Only if the people 
involved in the production of the crush porn were caught in the act 
could state anticruelty laws be invoked, and then only for the torture 
itself, not for the production and sale of depictions of the same. 
The Third Circuit held that this statute was an unconstitutional 
infringement on the First Amendment right to free speech.
200
 The 
court noted that there were already laws in all states against animal 
cruelty, and the intent of Congress was to supplant those laws with a 
law to prohibit the depiction of the cruelty. The Third Circuit rejected 
the analogy made to laws prohibiting the depiction of child 
pornography, finding that animals are not like children when it comes 
to the First Amendment analysis because animals do not perceive the 
injury of the depiction of the cruel act (as would a child) and thus the 
injury is not in the depiction but in the cruel act (which is already 
illegal under state statutes).
201
 
The ability to federalize the prosecution of animal cruelty cases 
was effectively terminated when the Third Circuit ruling was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens.
202
 However, the 
Court held that since its enactment, the First Amendment has 
permitted restrictions on categories of speech such as obscenity, 
defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct 
that “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” 
 
199 See generally State Animal Cruelty Laws, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/Fight-
Animal-Cruelty/Advocacy-Center/state-animal-cruelty-laws.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012) (providing information on animal cruelty laws in each state). 
200 United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008). 
201 See id. at 230. 
202 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
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but that depictions of animal cruelty should not be added to that 
list.
203
 
That the First Amendment precludes censoring speech that is 
cruelly harmful or deadly to nonhuman animals does not mean that 
the federal government has to supply copyright-based incentives for 
it. Defining crush porn as non-useful and non-progressive could 
discourage its production and distribution to the extent that it is 
commercially distributed. And if it is constitutional and socially 
desirable to criminally prosecute people such as Michael Vick for 
cruelty to animals,
204
 surely it is appropriate to withhold government-
provided copyright benefits from audiovisual recordings of activities 
such as killing animals for sexual gratification. 
4.  “Revenge Porn” 
“Revenge Porn” is pornography in which at least one of the 
subjects was unaware that sexual acts were being fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression or was unaware of or opposed to the work’s 
distribution, usually over the Internet.
205
 One object of its creation 
and distribution is to encourage and facilitate the humiliation and 
harassment of the victim subject. If one enters the words “revenge 
porn” into an Internet search engine, both the popularity and the 
profitability of the genre become immediately apparent. 
Victims can be photographed or filmed by hidden cameras.
206
 
Other times they may agree to be photographed or filmed but believe 
the works will be kept private.
207
 Still other victims could be drugged 
 
203 Id. at 1584–86 (quoting Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941)). 
204 See Apologetic Vick Gets 23-Month Sentence on Dogfighting Charges, ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3148549 (last updated Dec. 11, 2007) 
(discussing the football star’s conviction and sentence for financially contributing to a 
dogfighting enterprise). 
205 See David Kluft, Revenge Porn: “Is Anyone Up” on Copyright Law?, TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT LAW BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog 
.com/tags/dmca/. 
206 See Aja Styles, School Bullying Revenge Attack Sees Boy Jailed for Child 
Pornography, WA TODAY (July 26, 2011), http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/school   
-bullying-revenge-attack-sees-boy-jailed-for-child-pornography-20110725-1hx9c.html. 
207 See Adrian Chen, Meet the Hollywood Hackers Coming for Your Nude Pics, 
GAWKER (Aug. 29, 2011, 8:21 PM), http://gawker.com/5835611/meet-the-hollywood        
-hackers-coming-for-your-nude-pics; Marlene Naanes, Bad Breakup? Police Warn 
Posting Photos of Ex-lovers Online for Revenge Can Lead to Jail, NORTHJERSEY.COM 
(last updated Feb. 21, 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Ex-lovers 
_can_be_charged_for_posting_explicit_photos.html. 
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or coerced with threats, weapons, or actual violence to facilitate the 
recording of images.
208
 Once revenge pornography is circulated in 
cyberspace, there is no effective technological way to stop its 
distribution. 
Victims of revenge pornography rarely have effective options in 
terms of legal recourse either.
209
 Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, internet service providers are broadly 
immunized from liability for harms caused by online content that 
these companies host, and these companies do not generally have any 
legal obligation to assist parties injured by online content in 
identifying the human wrongdoers who post damaging materials.
210
 
The economic incentives fall in favor of allowing customers to upload 
and circulate anything they like, as broadly as they choose.
211
 While a 
full discussion of the merits and risks of Section 230 is beyond the 
scope of this Article, at the very least copyright law could be 
reconfigured so that it does not provide financial incentives for the 
commercial exploitation of revenge pornography. 
One alternative to denying copyright protections to works of 
revenge pornography would be to permit revenge porn copyrights to 
be recognized and even registered, but then to vest ownership of the 
copyrights in the victims, so that they could use the notice and 
takedown provisions of the DMCA to try to reign in the online 
distribution of works of revenge pornography. Admittedly, the 
practical efficacy of either approach is likely to be limited at best, 
because the goals of true revenge porn are not usually financial in 
 
208 See Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 161 (Ct. App. 2009), available at 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1489196.html. 
209 See Nancy Kim, Imposing Tort Liability on Websites for Cyber-Harassment, YLJ 
ONLINE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/tort     
-law/imposing-tort-liability-on-websites-for-cyber%11-harassment/. But see Zhang 
Dongya, ‘Aids Prostitute’ a Victim of Ex’s Revenge, YNET.COM (Nov. 3, 2009, 6:23 PM), 
http://bjtoday.ynet.com/3.1/0910/23/3954297.html; Mike Masnick, As Expected, Backpage 
is Not Liable for Prostitution Ads, TECHDIRT (Aug. 19, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.tech 
dirt.com/articles/20110819/02211215597/as-expected-backpage-is-not-liable-prostitution  
-ads.shtml. 
210 See Ali Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances 
Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (2010), available at http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol61 
/Zieglowsky_61-HLJ-1307.pdf. 
211 See David Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels? An Empirical Study 
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (June 30, 
2010), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/free-speech-savior-or-shield-scoundrels       
-empirical-study-intermediary-immunity-under-sectio. 
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nature. Broad distribution is usually the goal of the revenge 
pornographer. But stripping copyright protections from revenge at 
least has expressive value.
212
 And victims could perhaps take a tiny 
bit of solace from the inability of their tormentors to fully 
commoditize revenge pornography with government assistance. 
5.  Works in Which Performers Have Been Coerced, Physically 
Abused, or Endangered 
There are marked differences in the level of overt women-hating 
present in the vast array of currently copyrighted pornographic 
works.
213
 In pornography without overt violence or degrading acts or 
language, it may well appear that everyone is enjoying themselves. 
But off-camera coercion will not be apparent simply by viewing a 
work. At least one feminist commentator suggests that pornographers 
prey on women in precarious financial situations, citing the example 
of Nadya Suleman—the mother of octuplets—who received offers to 
appear in pornographic films when it became known that she was 
behind on her mortgage payments.
214
 
Physical abuse is common in pornography, and so is 
endangerment; performers’ bodies are injured, and they are exposed 
to dangerous diseases.
215
 Pornographers have mostly successfully 
 
212 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, 
AND THE LAW (2004); Danielle Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1352442. 
213 See, e.g., Gail Dines & Robert Jensen, The Anti-Feminist Politics Behind the 
Pornography that “Empowers” Women, ZNET (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.zcommuni 
cations.org/the-anti-feminist-politics-behind-the-pornography-that-empowers-women-by    
-gail-dines. 
214 See What Porn is About, SKEPIFERM (Jan. 3, 2011, 2:57 AM), http://skeptifem 
.blogspot.com/2011/01/what-porn-is-about.html; see also Melissa McEwan, The Porn 
King with a Heart of Gold, SHAKESVILLE (Dec. 31, 2010), http://shakespeares 
sister.blogspot.com/2010/12/porn-king-with-heart-of-gold.html; Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, 
‘Octomom’ Eviction on Hold as Landlord Meets with Porn Producer, WASH. POST (Dec. 
31, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30 /AR201012 
3004737.html; Octomom’s Calif. Home May be Sold to Porn King, CBS NEWS (Dec. 30, 
2010, 6:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/30/entertainment/main 
7198788.shtmlhttp://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_octomom_eviction; Porn Company ‘Vivid’ 
Offers to Help “Octomom” with Mortgage, KTLA.COM (Dec. 31, 2010, 4:26 AM), 
http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-octomom-eviction,0,4426841.story. 
215 See STOP PORN CULTURE!, http://stoppornculture.org/watch/ (last visited June 28, 
2012). But see Shira Tarrant, Porn: Pleasure or Profit? Ms. Interviews Gail Dines, Part II, 
MS. MAG. BLOG (July 7, 2010), http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/07/07/porn           
-pleasure-or-profit-ms-interviews-gail-dines-part-ii/. 
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avoided health and safety regulation
216
 and they routinely put 
performers in situations that require them to eat the vomit, urine, 
ejaculate, and feces of strangers; to endure penetration of their bodily 
orifices by large objects that tear and damage tissue and organs; and 
to engage in unprotected sex that results in rampant disease 
transmission.
217
 The rate of sexually transmitted disease infection 
among pornography performers is very high.
218
 Protecting copyrights 
in pornographic works without protecting the workers involved in 
producing these creative works is wrong at every level. Keeping the 
government out of the sex and reproductive lives of its citizenry has 
been a very important and extremely laudable goal of activist liberals 
and civil libertarians for decades,
219
 even though frank discussions 
about sex may not always be officially welcome.
220
 But changing the 
copyright laws to facilitate withholding copyright protections from 
harmful pornography is an appropriate intervention that simply 
reduces governmental involvement in incentivizing the production 
and distribution of these harmful works. 
 
216 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Clinic Blasts Calls for Added Oversight of Porn Industry, 
L.A. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010 
/10/following-the-announcement-this-week-that-an-adult-film-performer-tested-positive    
-for-hiv-a-san-fernando-valley-clinic-relea.html. But see Alex Dobuzinskis, Los Angeles 
Mayor Signs Porn Star Condom Requirement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012, 9:53 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/01/24/us/24reuters-condoms-porn-california.html 
?_r=1&hp (reporting City of Los Angeles’ ordinance requiring condom use applies only 
“to porn productions that approach the city for a permit, but officials said a permit was not 
required when filming in a soundstage”). 
217 Gabriel Mephibosheth, Calif. Wants Improved Occupational Health in Porn 
Industry, CULTURE NEWS (June 11, 2009, 9:50 PM), http://culturecampaign.blogspot.com 
/2009/06/calif-wants-improved-occupational.html; Tristan Taormino, Danger on the Set, 
VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-09-04/columns 
/danger-on-the-set/. 
218 Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Rong-Gong Lin II, Porn Film Performer Tests Positive for 
HIV, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at AA3, available at http://articles.latimes.com 
/2010/oct/13/local/la-me-porn-hiv-20101013; Ian Lovett, Condom Rule Sought for Sex-
Film Sets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A18 (detailing high rates of sexually transmitted 
diseases among performers in pornography). 
219 See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, NOW: Always on the Front Lines, 
http://www.now.org/issues/abortion/reproductive_justice.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
220 When then U.S. Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders recommended promoting 
masturbation to children as a safe and risk-free sexual outlet, she was fired. Douglas Jehl, 
Surgeon General Forced to Resign by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at A1. 
BARTOW 10/4/2012  2:20 PM 
48 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 1 
IV 
CONSEQUENCES OF COPYRIGHT WITHHOLDING 
Works produced by U.S. citizens must be registered with the U.S. 
Copyright Office before they can be the basis for claims made under 
the Copyright Act.
221
 Under Section 408(c)(1) of the Copyright Act, 
“[t]he Register of Copyrights is authorized to specify by regulation 
the administrative classes into which works are to be placed for 
purposes of deposit and registration.”
222
 While it is true that the 
statute specifies that “[t]his administrative classification of works has 
no significance with respect to the subject matter of copyright or the 
exclusive rights provided by this title,” this can be changed.
223
 The 
Copyright Act should be amended to make pornography a specific 
category of copyrightable work with the express stipulation that 
harmful pornographic works are not eligible for registration or 
protection.
224
 The Copyright Office would make the initial, 
appealable decision about whether a pornographic work qualified as 
non-progressive and non-useful. This would obviously require an 
increase in the size and mandate of the Copyright Office.
225
 
Copyright registrations that were improperly issued could be 
invalidated if harmfulness was proven at any time. Pornographers 
empirically care only about unauthorized literal copying, so as a 
practical matter it is only the reproduction right that would be 
contested.
226
 Harmfulness would also be available to defendants as a 
defense to allegations of copyright infringement. If a party accused of 
copyright infringement convinced a fact finder that a pornographic 
work was non-progressive and non-useful and therefore unworthy of 
copyright protection, there would be no enforceable copyright in the 
work, and therefore nothing to infringe. While that could have the 
troubling effect of incentivizing the distribution of harmful works by 
third parties, because they would have nothing to fear from copyright 
 
221 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2006). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 This may require some finessing with respect to the Unites States’ obligations vis-à-
vis the WTO. In conversation, Kenneth Crews suggested one possible solution would be to 
allow all porn to be copyrighted, but to deny remedies to harmful pornography. 
225 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKFORCE AND ORGANIZATION, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/s-plan2008/s-plan2008-2013-3.pdf (describing staffing 
and operations of the U.S. Copyright Office). 
226 This is somewhat amusingly ironic. 
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law for doing so, it would simultaneously strongly disincentivize the 
creation of harmful works in the first place, since they would not be 
copyright protected.
227
 Surely it is more preferable to have one work 
in which the performers were harmed copied a million times than to 
have tens of thousands of works in which the performers are harmed 
incentivized by governmental promulgation of the copyright laws. 
Singling out pornography for disparate copyright treatment is a 
radical proposition, but less extreme than it may seem at first blush. 
The Copyright Act already covers some genres of creative works 
while excluding others. For example, computer programs are 
protectable as literary works,
228
 but cooking recipes are not 
protectable at all;
229
 photographs are copyrightable,
230
 but hairstyles 
are not.
231
 The exclusive rights a copyright secures differ across 
categories of works.
232
 Even within the statutorily prescribed 
categories, some works get different protections than others.
233
 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that the Copyright 
Term Extension Act was constitutional in part because “Congress has 
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection” and this 
made heightened First Amendment scrutiny unnecessary.
234
 
Legislatively establishing a category of works for which copyright 
protections may be limited or denied based on their content almost 
certainly alters the traditional contours of copyright law. But 
amending the copyright laws to reduce the ways in which the 
economic value of an original work of authorship can be exploited 
would not rise to the level of “censorship” within the First 
Amendment’s meaning of the word. 
 
227 A pornography film or video can cost approximately $50,000 to produce. See 
Private Worlds 2: Porn Sells?, FILM IRELAND, http://www.filmireland.net/exclusives 
/privateworlds2.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
228 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS, 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf. 
229 Recipes, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl122.html (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2012). 
230 Copyright Registration of Photographs, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl107.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
231 Dennis Crouch, I Almost Cut My Hair: Haircut Property, PATENTLYO (Jan. 31, 
2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/i-almost-cut-my-hair-haircut-property 
.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO
+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29&utm_content=FaceBook. 
232 See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
233 See, e.g., §§ 104A, 106A. 
234 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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It is true that government actors would have to make content-based 
decisions about which pornographic works belonged in the “non-
useful” category and that would be problematic for a number of 
reasons. Achieving consistent application of an even clearly 
articulated standard of non-usefulness would be difficult; political 
pressures might lead the relevant administrators to deprive certain 
pornographic works of copyright protections overly expansively and 
the buckets of money that pornographers have at their disposal to 
spend on lobbyists and lawyers would ensure that the sorting process 
was complicated and expensive. 
Many of the early Internet-based copyright cases involved 
pornographic materials, leading some practitioners to describe the 
emerging field of Cyberspace Law as “The Law of Porn.”
235
 
Companies like Playboy brought suit against online Bulletin Board 
services, usenet groups, and even browser companies to try to prevent 
the unauthorized uploading, hosting, and downloading of images in 
which they claimed copyrights.
236
 Once bandwidth increased enough 
so that movies could be widely sold or gifted online by so-called 
pirates, pornographic works were commonly among those 
distributed.
237
 According to one observer, “[t]he porn industry 
produces 13,000 films a year, generating $10 to 15 billion in revenue. 
In comparison, the Hollywood film industry produces about 600 films 
a year and generates around nine to 10 billion dollars.”
238
 It is hard to 
predict how significant the impact would be of making copyright 
protections unavailable for some portion of pornographic works. At 
present, pornographers take robust advantage of copyright law.
239
 In 
 
235 I first heard this observation in about 1997 from Robert Hamilton, who litigated 
some early Internet disputes on behalf of Compuserve and taught Cyberspace Law as an 
adjunct at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. See generally Robert W. 
Hamilton, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/rwhamilton/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
236 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
237 See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Free Porn on ‘Tube Sites’ Puts a Big Dent in Industry, USA 
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-03-02-porn02_ST_N.htm?csp=Tech 
(last updated Mar. 2, 2010, 9:59 PM). 
238 Carly Perez, Professor Points Out Inequality, Racism in Porn, FOGHORN ONLINE 
(Nov. 13, 2008), http://foghorn.usfca.edu/2008/11/professor-points-out-inequality-racism  
-in-porn/ (citing Robert Jensen, Interfaith Summer Institute for Justice, Peace, and Social 
Movements Public Forum: Pornography and the Perfect Storm of Inequality: Sexism, 
Racism, and Economic Exploitation in Contemporary Pornography, (Aug. 12, 2008)). 
239 See Enigmax, Porn Studios Set To Target 65,000 Movie Uploaders, 
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 12, 2009), http://torrentfreak.com/porn-studios-set-to-target-65000 
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2009, one group of about fifty pornography companies brought 
infringement suits against ten thousand people alleged to have made 
infringing downloads of copyrighted pornographic works.
240
 The 
pornography company Perfect 10 has been described as being on “a 
litigation frenzy.”
241
 
Another pornographer recently filed suit against over five thousand 
defendants on behalf of four pornographers.
242
 Using the implicit 
threat of exposing defendants’ pornography proclivities through 
copyright litigation may be one effective way pornographers are 
reaping quick and lucrative settlements.
243
 Folks who would not 
greatly mind being publicly tagged as downloaders of bad mainstream 
movies might be much more reluctant to be publicly identified as 
consumers of works entitled “Explicit Violent Sexual Acts Involving 
Performers Identified by Abhorrent Racial Epithets” or something 
similar but far more specific. Removing the threat of copyright-based 
prosecutions might lead to increased unauthorized distribution of 
extant harmful works because infringing downloaders would no 
longer fear infringement liability or the public censure it might 
trigger. But loss of a legal tool with which to coerce cash out of 
pornography consumers who feared exposure would surely also 
disincentivize the production of new pornographic works if squeezing 
alleged infringers is a significant source of revenue. 
Pornography that was not accorded copyright protection could still 
be produced in any form, and pornographers would doubtlessly 
 
-movie-uploaders-090912/; Greg Sandoval, Porn Maker Sues 7,098 Alleged Film Pirates, 
CNET (Nov. 2, 2010, 4:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20021438-261.html; 
Swartz, supra note 237. 
240 See Enigmax, supra note 239. 
241 Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Opinion in Perfect 10 v. CCBill, ERIC GOLDMAN 
TECH. & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar. 29, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives 
/2007/03/ninth_circuit_o.htm (“Perfect 10 publishes a pornographic magazine and 
operates a pornography website. It appears that Perfect 10 photos are routinely infringed 
by others because Perfect 10 has been on a litigation frenzy. They have brought at least 
four enforcement actions that have produced important Internet law opinions (involving 
the defendants Cybernet Ventures, Visa and Google in addition to this one).”). 
242 See Sandoval, supra note 239; Greg Sandoval, Porn Studios’ Copyright Lawyer: ‘I 
Will Sue’ (Q&A), CNET (Oct. 5, 2010, 8:49 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3       
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true in the United States. See, e.g., David Cairns, ACS: Law Faces Lawsuit After ‘Porn 
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continue to peddle non-progressive and non-useful pornographic 
wares using technologies that obstruct unauthorized copying or 
redistribution. Pornographers could also continue to distribute 
pornography via subscription models, for which customers enter into 
enforceable contracts which impose harsh economic penalties on 
subscribers who exceed the terms and conditions of their use 
agreements.
244
 The government would not be silencing 
pornographers; it would simply be reducing the economic incentives 
copyright laws provide them with respect to certain categories of 
pornographic speech. 
V 
LESSONS FROM PATENT LAW AND TRADEMARK LAW 
A.  Patent Law 
Until the 1950s, patent examiners sometimes denied patents to 
otherwise patentable inventions on moral grounds. The Patent Act
245
 
did not direct them to do this; the practice probably originated in 
Lowell v. Lewis, an 1817 patent case in which the concepts of moral 
utility and non-useful inventions were raised.
246
 This became far less 
common by the 1970s in part because courts became wary of denying 
patents based on nonstatutory moral concerns raised by unelected 
government functionaries.
247
 
Patent law, however, is not analogous enough to copyright law to 
be usefully illustrative. Adding moral dimensions to copyright law by 
denying copyright protections to harmful pornography would be 
effectuated via the legislative process through changes to the 
Copyright Act. If a work is deemed unworthy of copyright protection 
by the Copyright Office, the decision would be based on a targeted 
administrative review, rather than being one small component of the 
lengthy, detailed, and expensive examination process that patent 
applications undergo. 
Moreover, a patent describing a non-useful, non-progressive 
product or process can issue without the invention ever being made or 
 
244 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 45. 
245 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–293 (1952). 
246 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 177 (5th ed. 2009). 
247 Id. 
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practiced. A patent that teaches people skilled in the relevant art how 
to construct something dangerous can be secured, its circulation 
limited, and laws can be passed to prevent people from practicing 
harmful inventions as necessary.
248
 This is a different situation from 
copyright law where, for example, a movie in which children are 
raped or performers are injured receives copyright only after the work 
is completed and the production-based harm is already done. 
Morality is a patentability consideration in Europe, and there are 
still moral questions that are bound up with U.S. patent law.
249
 
Professor Margo Bagley, for example, has questioned the “patent 
first, ask questions later” approach of the United States, particularly 
with regard to controversial biotechnology-related subject matter.
250
 
Moral considerations could become explicitly addressed by the Patent 
Act in the future. 
B.  Trademark Law 
Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, a trademark shall be 
refused registration on the principal register “on account of its nature” 
if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous 
matter.”
251
 The body of law that has developed from judicial 
interpretations of this statutory limitation over time is admittedly 
incoherent.
252
 Trademarks referencing sex, race, religion, sexual 
orientation, and scatological imagery have all been denied registration 
under Section 2(a), apparently constitutionally. To list just a few 
examples, the following marks were found to be too immoral and 
scandalous to warrant federal registration on the principal registry: (1) 
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“Cocaine” as the trademark for a soft drink;
253
 (2) “Pussy” for an 
energy drink;
254
 (3) “Bullshit” for a wide variety of beverages;
255
 (4) 
the terms BONG HITS 4 JESUS
256
 and DE PUTA MADRE (“whore 
mother”) for clothing;
257
 (5) “Dick Heads” for a restaurant;
258
 and 
(6)”You cum like a girl” for clothing.
259
 Marks that survived Section 
2(a) challenges include “Big Pecker’s” for a restaurant, “Redskins” 
for a football team, “Bad Frog” for beer (depicting a frog holding up 
its “middle finger”), “Dykes on Bikes” for a women’s motorcycle 
club, and “Black Tail” for an adult entertainment magazine featuring 
photographs of both naked and scantily-clad African-American 
women.
260
 
Despite the stunning lack of discernible consistency in the rulings 
under Section 2(a) on what constitutes a mark that is scandalous and 
immoral,
261
 this provision has never been held to violate the First 
Amendment.
262
 Marks that cannot be federally registered can still be 
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used in commerce, and that appears to keep this content-based 
trademark registration restriction within the bounds of 
constitutionality. One can hope that sorting out which pornographic 
works should be deemed non-useful, and therefore outside the scope 
of copyright protections, could be accomplished with more 
consistency and predictability, given that the bases on which to deny 
copyright protection discussed above allow for more evidence-based 
determinations that do not take subjective social morality concerns 
into account. The concerns driving this denial of government 
resources are for people directly harmed by the production and 
distribution of the pornography, not for an anonymous audience of 
consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment may secure citizens with the right to produce 
and distribute harmful works of pornography. Certainly that is the 
current state of free speech jurisprudence. But there is no legal 
requirement that the government provide economic incentives for the 
creation of harmful pornographic works. With the current practice of 
indiscriminately according pornographic works copyright protection, 
the government encourages and incentivizes the production of 
pornography that is non-progressive and non-useful and therefore 
beyond the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. This must cease. Amending the Copyright Act to reduce 
the ways in which the economic value of harmful pornography can be 
exploited via copyright law is a legitimate policy choice that Congress 
can and should make immediately. 
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